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CASE NOTES
FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE - Consensual Encounter or Coerced Questioning? United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct.
2105 (2002).
INTRODUCTION

On February 4, 1999, Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown, Jr.,
were passengers on a Greyhound bus en route from Ft. Lauderdale, Florida,
to Detroit, Michigan.' During a scheduled stop at Tallahassee, Florida, all
thirty passengers aboard the bus were asked to exit the bus for cleaning and
refueling procedures. 2 After the procedures were completed, the driver
checked the passengers' tickets as they reboarded the bus Once the driver
had checked in all of the passengers, he went to the terminal to complete the
required paperwork.4 As the driver was leaving, he gave three members of
the Tallahassee Police Department permission to board the bus.5 The officers were dressed in street clothes, had concealed weapons, and displayed
their badges around their necks or in their hands.6
Officers Lang, Hoover, and Blackburn boarded the bus to conduct
routine questioning in accordance with Florida's effort to deter the transportation of drugs and illegal weapons.7 Once on the bus, Officers Lang and
Blackburn proceeded to the back of the bus, where Officer Blackburn remained during the interdiction process.' The third member of the team, Officer Hoover, remained at the front of the bus. 9 He knelt on the driver's seat
next to the exit where he could see all of the passengers and they could see
him.'" Officer Lang, without giving a general announcement to the passengers identifying himself or explaining the reason for his presence, began
questioning passengers." At no time during the questioning did Officer
officers inform the passengers they had the right to refuse
Lang or the other
12
to cooperate.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
631).

United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2109 (2002).
Id.; United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787, 788 (1lthCir. 2000).
Drayton, 122 S. Ct. at 2109.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Drayton, 231 F.3d at 788-89.
United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2109 (2002).
Id.

Id.
Id.
United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787, 789 (11th Cir. 2000).
Brief for Respondent at 4, United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105 (2002) (No. 01-
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As Officer Lang worked his way back to the front of the bus, he encountered Drayton and Brown. 3 At this point, Officer Lang, with his face
twelve to eighteen inches away from Drayton and Brown, and in a voice just
loud enough for Drayton and Brown to hear, said, "I'm investigator Lang
with the Tallahassee Police Department. We're conducting bus interdiction,
attempting to deter drugs and illegal weapons being transported on the bus.
Do you have any bags on the bus?"14 Brown and Drayton answered by
pointing to a bag in the overhead luggage compartment. 5 Officer Lang then
asked Drayton and Brown if he could search their luggage. 6 Both Drayton
and Brown answered in the affirmative and the officers searched the luggage, which contained no contraband. 7 However, this was not the end of
the search, as Officer Lang then requested a pat down search of Brown.'
Brown subsequently gave him permission for the search. 9 During the
search, Officer Lang detected hard objects in both thigh areas that were similar to drug packages he had found on other occasions.2
Lang arrested
Brown, escorted him off the bus, and asked Drayton to consent to a similar
search. 2' Drayton gave Lang permission for a pat down search in which
Lang again found hard objects in the thigh areas.22 Consequently, Drayton
was also arrested.23 Once off the bus, the officers determined the hard objects to be plastic bundles of powder cocaine.24
Drayton and Brown were convicted separately in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.25 Both Drayton
and Brown appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying the
motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine.26 Drayton and Brown argued
the evidence had been obtained by an illegal search and seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.2 7 In a consolidated appeal, a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision of the
District Court and held that the bus search violated the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.2" The panel rea13.
United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2109 (2002).
14.
Id.; Brief for Petitioner at 4, United States v. Drayton, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (2002) (No.
01-63 1) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
15.
Drayton, 122 S.Ct. at 2109; Petitioner's Brief at 4.
16.
Drayton, 122 S. Ct. at 2109.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Id. at 2109-10.
23.
Id. at 2110.
24.
Id.
25.
United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787, 788 (11 th Cir. 2000).
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
United States v. Drayton, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 2110 (2002).
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soned that a reasonable person would not have felt free to ignore the officers
or exit the bus without some positive indication from the police that he could
refuse to consent.29
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether officers conducting bus interdiction by asking passengers questions
"must advise bus passengers during these encounters of their right not to
cooperate."3 In a six-to-three decision, the Court reversed the Eleventh
Circuit's decision and held that the totality of the circumstances did not create an illegal search and seizure.3 Furthermore, the Court held that during
suspicionless bus searches, law enforcement officers do not have to inform
passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate with the officers.32
Initially, this case note will trace the development of Fourth
Amendment search and seizure consent law prior to United States v. Drayton. Secondly, this case note will discuss the case history of United States v.
Drayton. Finally, this case note will analyze the "totality of the circumstances" test as applied by the United States Supreme Court in Drayton.
During this analysis, this case note will argue: (1) the Drayton decision has
lessened the protection the Fourth Amendment was intended to provide; (2)
the reasonable person test used to determine the consensual nature of encounters between law enforcement and citizens as applied by the United
States Supreme Court is unrealistic and allows governmental interests to
overrun individual constitutional rights; and (3) Drayton was decided under
the influence of current events.
BACKGROUND

The foundation of American search and seizure law is set forth in
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 3
The authors of the Constitution added the Fourth Amendment because they:
[S]ought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Drayton, 231 F.3d at 790.
Drayton, 122 S.Ct.at 2108.
Id.at 2110.
Id.at 2110,2112.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.34
Consensual Encounters
Prior to 1968, Fourth Amendment protection against illegal seizures
and unreasonable searches was analyzed in terms of probable cause.35 In
Terry v. Ohio, however, the Supreme Court provided an exception to the
general rule that seizures of persons must be based on probable cause.36 In
Terry, a police officer was patrolling a downtown area of Cleveland, Ohio,
when he noticed two individuals acting suspiciously.37 The police officer
suspected the men were preparing to conduct a robbery.3" In response to this
apprehension, the officer followed the men and finally approached them to
ask questions.39 After the officer asked them a few questions, he grabbed
one of the men, Terry, and conducted a quick frisk. This frisk revealed a
pistol in Terry's coat.4 ' Terry was subsequently convicted of carrying a concealed weapon."
Based upon these facts, the Court decided whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and conduct a limited search
without probable cause.43 After an evaluation of the competing interests, the
Court concluded that in order to provide protection to the nation's law enforcement officials, police officers must have some authority to search for
weapons without probable cause to make an arrest when the officer reasonably believes he is dealing with an individual that is armed and dangerous."
The search is reasonable, however, only if a reasonably prudent person in the
same circumstance would believe that his safety or others' safety was in
peril.45

34.
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 646 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
35.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1979).
36.
Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
37.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
Id. at 6.
38.
Id. at 6-7.
39.
40.
Id. at 7.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 15.
43.
44.
Id. at 27.
45.
Id.
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In addition to deciding the probable cause issue, the Court also addressed the matter of consensual encounters.' The Court noted, "Obviously,
not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we
conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."47 Justice White, in his concurring
opinion, agreed with this contention when he wrote, "There is nothing in the
Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets."4'
The Court further clarified the bounds of a consensual encounter and
further developed the definition of a seizure in United States v.
Mendenhall.49 In Mendenhall, agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) approached Sylvia Mendenhall while she was passing through an
airport and began asking her questions.5 ° The agents asked to see
Mendenhall's identification and flight ticket.5 The personal identification
and the ticket that Mendenhall subsequently provided to the police bore different names.52 After returning the identification and ticket, the officers
asked Mendenhall to accompany them to a DEA office in the airport. 3 At
the office, Mendenhall was asked if she would consent to a search of her
person and she answered in the affirmative. 4 During the search, heroin was
discovered in Mendenhall's undergarments." Mendenhall was subsequently
arrested and convicted.56 Ultimately, the Supreme Court was called upon to
determine if Mendenhall's Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. 7
The Mendenhall Court began its analysis by noting that all seizures
of a person, no matter how brief, must pass the Fourth Amendment requirement that the seizure be based upon objective justification. 58 The Court then
46.
Id. at 19 n. 16. Although the Court discussed the issue of consensual encounters, it did
not make an explicit ruling indicating the consequences or limits of such a consensual encounter. See id. ("We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of
investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of 'detention' and/or interrogation."). See also id. at 16 ("Given the narrowness of this question, we have no occasion
to canvass in detail the constitutional limitations upon the scope of a policeman's power when
he confronts a citizen without probable cause to arrest him.").
47.
Id. at 19 n.16.
48.
Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (noting that although officer can approach and ask
questions, citizen being approached can simply walk away).
49.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (Stewart, J., plurality).
50.
Id. at 547-48 (Stewart, J., plurality).
51.
Id. at 548 (Stewart, J., plurality).
52.
Id. (Stewart, J., plurality).
53.
Id. (Stewart, J., plurality).
54.
Id. at 548-49 (Stewart, J., plurality).
55.
Id. at 549 (Stewart, J., plurality).
56.
Id. (Stewart, J., plurality).
57.
Id. at 547 (Stewart, J., plurality).
58.
Id. at 551 (Stewart, J., plurality).
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proceeded to determine if Mendenhall had been seized when the officers
approached her and asked her questions, including the requests to see her
identification and plane ticket.59 In adhering to the Terry decision, the Court
first explained that constitutional safeguards are only implemented when a
6
citizen is restrained by means of physical force or show of authority. " Next,
the Court stated that "the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but to prevent arbitrary
and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and
personal security of individuals."'" Finally, in concluding its seizure analysis, the Court clarified the Terry test by holding that a person is seized when
circumstances surrounding the incident indicate that a reasonable person
62
would have believed he was not free to leave. The Court then applied the
facts to the new standard and found that Mendenhall was not seized when
63
the officers approached her and asked her questions.
In 1983, the Court again addressed consensual encounters in Florida
64
v. Royer, a case with facts very similar to Mendenhall. Regardless of the
65
similarity of the facts, Royer produced a different result than Mendenhall.
In Royer, two plain-clothes officers approached Royer in an airport, identified themselves as policemen, and asked him if he had time to answer some
questions; Royer said he did.66 The officers requested to see Royer's identification and airline tickets.67 As in Mendenhall, the items carried different
names.6" The officers kept the ticket and identification and asked Royer to
accompany them to a room.69 Once in the room, the officers asked to search
70
Royer's luggage, and he unlocked the luggage without orally consenting.
7' Royer was arrested
Consequently, drugs were found in Royer's luggage.
and later convicted.72

Id. at 551-57 (Stewart, J., plurality).
59.
Id. at 552 (Stewart, J., plurality) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968)).
60.
Id. at 553-54 (Stewart, J., plurality) (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
61.
543, 554 (1976)) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 554 (Stewart, J., plurality). The Court noted that some circumstances that
62.
amounted to a seizure might include the threatening presence of several officers, an officer
displaying a weapon, physical touching of the citizen by the officer, or the use of language or
tone of voice to indicate that compliance was required. Id.
Id. at 555 (Stewart, J., plurality).
63.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (White, J., plurality).
64.
plurality).
Id. at 506-07 (White, J.,
65.
Id. at 493-94 (White, J., plurality).
66.
67. Id. at 494 (White, J., plurality).
Id. (White, J., plurality).
68.
plurality).
Id. (White, J.,
69.
Id. (White, J., plurality).
70.
plurality).
Id. (White, J.,
71.
Id. at 495 (White, J., plurality).
72.
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The Royer Court began its analysis with six preliminary observations.73 First, the Court noted in the absence of probable cause, the validity
of the luggage search depended on Royer's consent.74 Secondly, the Court
explained:
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the
street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if
the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a
criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions.75
In a third observation, the Court noted that not all seizures of the person
must be justified by probable cause because in some instances, under Terry,
an officer may stop and frisk a citizen "if there is articulable suspicion that a
person has committed or is about to commit a crime. 76 Next, in a related
observation, the Court stated that Terry only allows for limited exceptions to
the general rule requiring probable cause.77 The Court went on to note that
after Dunaway and Brown, statements given during a period of illegal detention, even if voluntarily given, are inadmissible if "they are the product of
78
the illegal detention and not the result of an independent act of free will.
73.
Id. at 497-501 (White, J., plurality).
74.
Id. at 497 (White, J., plurality).
75.
Id. (White, J., plurality).
76.
Id. at 498 (White, J., plurality).
77.
Id. at 499 (White, J., plurality).
78.
Id. at 501 (White, J., plurality) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218-19
(1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-02 (1975)). In Brown, a man was arrested in his
apartment without probable cause. Brown, 422 U.S. at 591-92. The police then took the man
to the police station where they began questioning him. Id. at 592-93. Ultimately, the man
made statements that he was involved in a murder. Id. at 594-95. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide if voluntary statements made after an illegal arrest are admissible due to the recitation of the Miranda warnings. Id. at 591-92. The Court decided that
the statements were not admissible. Id. at 605. In reaching the holding, the Court noted:
If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an
unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the
Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be
substantially diluted. Arrests made without warrant or without probable
cause, for questioning or investigation, would be encouraged by the
knowledge that evidence derived therefrom could well be made admissible at trial by the simple expendent of giving Miranda warnings.
Id. at 602. Although the Court refused to adopt a per se rule that admitted statements made
after the Miranda warnings, the Court also refused to rule that all statements made after an
illegal arrest are inadmissible. Id. at 603. Instead, the Court set forth a test requiring a break
in the causal chain between the illegal arrest and the incriminating statements. Id. at 602. In
Dunaway, a man was apprehended by the police in connection with a recent burglary.
Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 203. The police, however, did not have enough information to warrant
an arrest. Id. Nevertheless, the police kept the man at the police station where he would have
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In the final preliminary notation, the Court explained that if a seizure did not
occur then Royer's consent to the luggage search would be valid.79
After making the preliminary observations, the Court went on to
hold that Royer was seized. 80 The Court based this holding on the fact that
the narcotics agents did not return Royer's ticket and identification, asked
him to accompany them to a room, and did not inform Royer that he was
free to leave."s This, as the Court noted, created an effective seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because the actions by the officers
amounted to a show of authority such that a reasonable person would not
have believed he was free to leave.82
The Court went on to note that the Royer decision was consistent
with the Mendenhall holding, regardless of the differing end results. s3 The
Court explained how the facts of the cases distinguish them and how the
facts allow for different holdings.84 For instance, in Mendenhall, the ticket
and identification were given back, but in Royer, the officers retained the
ticket and identification. 85 Furthermore, in Royer the man's luggage was
detained, but in Mendenhall there was no luggage involved in the search.86
In closing its analysis, the Court acknowledged that there is not a
bright-line test to determine when a consensual encounter becomes a seizure.87 In fact, according to the Court, there are so many possible circumstances that "it is unlikely that the courts can reduce to a sentence or paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable answers to the question whether
there has been an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment." 8

been restrained if he attempted to leave. Id. The man eventually incriminated himself in
connection with the crime. Id. Initially, the Court held that the police had violated the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments when they seized the petitioner without probable cause. Id. at
216. The Court, following Brown, also held that the connection between the police conduct
and the incriminating evidence obtained during illegal detention was not sufficiently attenuated to permit the use of the evidence at trial. Id. at 219.
79.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983) (White, J., plurality).
plurality).
Id. (White, J.,
80.
Id. (White, J., plurality).
81.
Id. at 501-02 (White, J., plurality).
82.
Id. at 503 n.9 (White, J., plurality).
83.
Id. (White, J., plurality).
84.
85.
Id. (White, J., plurality).
Id. (White, J., plurality).
86.
87.
Id. at 506 (White, J., plurality).
plurality). Although the Court declined the opportunity to
Id. at 506-07 (White, J.,
88.
create a bright line test, the Court did note that "by returning his ticket and driver's license,
and informing him that he was free to go ifhe so desired, the officers may have obviated any
claim that the encounter was anything but a consensual matter from start to finish." Id. at 504
(White, J., plurality) (emphasis added).
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In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, the Court
analyzed the constitutionality of consensual searches that occur at the workplace. 9 In Delgado, INS agents questioned workers at a factory in an effort
to determine the citizenship of the workers. 9 The agents came to the factory
during working hours and conducted surveys of the workforce. 9 During the
surveys, some agents walked through the factory and questioned the workers
while other agents were posted at the exits.92 Nevertheless, during the survey the workers were allowed to move around the factory and continue their
work. 3 As a result of the questioning, several workers from the factory
were detained as illegal aliens.94 Subsequently, the detainees filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California claiming
that the factory searches were unconstitutional.95 The District Court granted
summary judgment to the INS. 96 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
then reversed the District Court and left the Supreme Court to decide if the
surveys and the manner in which they were conducted (i.e., with officers at
the exits) constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 97
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging that the Fourth
Amendment does not prevent all contact between citizens and the police and
that not all encounters between citizens and policemen constitute seizures.98
The Court stated that, according to Royer, questioning a citizen about his
identification does not create a seizure. 99 Following the Mendenhall test, the
Court also noted that a seizure only occurs if a reasonable person would feel
like he was not free to leave."° In using these notations as guidelines, the
Court held that a seizure did not occur and the questioning only amounted to
"classic consensual encounters."''
The Court rejected the claim that the
officers at the exits would make a reasonable person feel like he was not free
to leave. 2 In fact, as the Court noted, the officers at the doors "should have
given respondents no reason to believe that they would be detained if they
gave truthful answers to the questions put to them or if they simply refused
to answer."'0 3 Furthermore, as the Court explained, the real reason the em-

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 213.

94.

Id.

95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 214.
97.
Id. at 214-15.
98.
Id. at 215 (citations omitted).
99.
Id. at 216.
100. Id. at 216-17 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart,
J., plurality).
101.
Id.at218,221.
102. Id. at 218.
103.
Id.
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ployees could not leave the building is because their employer required them
to stay at the factory and continue working."
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court again addressed the issue
5 In Chesternut, the Suof personal seizures in Michigan v. Chesternut
preme Court was called upon to decide whether an officer's pursuit of a citi°
zen who ran upon sight of the police constituted a seizure." The facts of the
case indicated that Chesternut was talking to another man on a street corner
7 Chesternut
when a patrol car containing four police officers pulled up.
08 The patrol car folthen ran around the corner and up the adjoining street.
lowed Chesternut around the corner, drove beside him for a while, and then
the officers ultimately apprehended him. 9 Chesternut was charged with
possessing illegal substances; however, the district court dismissed the
charges." 0
In its analysis, the Court began by criticizing both parties for trying
to suggest a bright-line rule for seizures."' Instead, as the Court noted, seizure is determined by all of the circumstances surrounding the incident using
the "free to leave" test from Mendenhall."2 The Court further noted that it
has purposefully avoided a bright-line rule because bright-line rules are too
precise."' The totality of the circumstances test focuses on the entire incident, rather than particular details, because what constitutes a restraint of

104. Id.
Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988). In 1984, the Supreme Court addressed
105.
a case involving consensual encounters in airports. Florida v. Rodriquez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984).
The facts were very similar to the circumstances in Royer and Mendenhall. Id. at 2-4. Therefore, using the test set forth in Royer and Mendenhall, the Court found that no seizure occurred. Id. at 5-7. Although the case dealt with consensual encounters, the Court did not
provide any new guidelines or rules when it made its ruling. Id.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 569.
106.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. During the chase, Chesternut pulled packages of codeine pills from his pockets
and discarded them on the ground. Id. The police did not apprehend and arrest Chesterut
until after he had discarded the pills and the police had determined that the pills were illegal
drugs. Id.
110. Id. at 569-70.
Id. at 572.
111.
Id. (citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984); United States v. Mendenhall,
112.
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., plurality)). Although the Court noted the Mendenhall
test in the analysis, the Court may have made an amendment to the Mendenhall "free to
leave" test when it stated that the police action "was not so intimidating that respondent could
reasonably have believed that he was not free to disregard the police presence and go about
his business." Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 (1988) (citing Delgado,466 U.S. at
216). Although the Court cites Delgado as the source of this new test, the Delgado holding
does not explicitly set out the new test. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216. Instead, Delgado appears
to rely on the previous "free to leave" test as promulgated in Mendenhall. Id. at 216-17 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (Stewart, J., plurality)).
Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573.
113.
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liberty will change in each varying situation.114 The Court explained that the
totality of the circumstances test allows the attending officers to decide what
will amount to a seizure in any given situation." 5
In applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Chesternut
Court found that a seizure had not occurred because a reasonable person
would not have felt like the police were trying to capture him or restrain his
movement." 6 The Court then listed several factors that, although they did
not occur, could have indicated a seizure had they occurred." 7 Initially, the
Court mentioned that the police did not activate the sirens or flashers nor did
the police direct Chesternut to stop."' The Court also noted that the police
did not display their weapons and did not drive the car in a manner that
would have halted Chesternut's progress.' 19
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Chesternut, it appeared that
the Mendenhall "free to leave" test was the settled standard to determine
consensual searches. Nevertheless, in Chesternut, the Court appeared to
consider a variation of the Mendenhall test. 120 In California v. Hodari D.,
the United States Supreme Court discussed the Chesternut variation.12 ' In
HodariD., a case with issues very similar to Chesternut, a juvenile was arrested for possession of cocaine. 2 2 On a routine patrol, police officers noticed several people gathered in a group. 123 As the officers approached the
group in the patrol car, Hodari D. ran from the scene. 124 The officers became
suspicious and chased Hodari D. 125 During the chase, Hodari D. dropped
drugs from27his pockets. 126 The police eventually apprehended and arrested
Hodari D.1
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if
Hodari D. was seized at the time he dropped the drugs. 28 The Court also
114.
Id.
115.
Id. at 574.
116.
Id. at 574-75. The Court acknowledged that there may be some instances where a
police pursuit may amount to a seizure if the police command the person to halt. Id. at 576
n.9. Nevertheless, they noted that such circumstances were not before them in Chesternut.
Id. They therefore decided to "leave to another day the determination of the circumstances in
which police pursuit could amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment." Id.
117.
Id. at 575.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
For a discussion of the Chesternut variation of the Mendenhall "free to leave" test,
see supra note 112.
121.
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991).
122.
Id. at 623.
123.
Id. at 622.
124.
Id. at 622-23.
125.
Id. at 623.
126.
Id.
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
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phrased the question presented as "whether, with respect to a show of authority as with respect to application of physical force, a seizure occurs even
though the subject does not yield."' 9 The Court began its analysis by noting
the common meaning of seizure. 3 However, as the Court acknowledged,
seizure does not apply to a policeman who yells at a fleeing suspect to "stop,
in the name of the law."' 131 The Court also noted that the officer's uncomplied-with show of authority did not constitute a common-law arrest, which
is considered a seizure. 32 Next, the Court analyzed the seizure issue in light
of Mendenhall and Chesternut 33 The Court decided that a seizure had not
occurred under the Mendenhall test.'34 The Court then discussed the
Chesternut totality of the circumstances variation. 35 The Court did not determine, however, whether a seizure had occurred under this test. 36 In conclusion, the Court held that Hodari D. had not been seized because he did not
comply with any show of authority that may have been present.'
In Florida v. Bostick, the United States Supreme Court analyzed
consensual searches on buses in light of the Delgado, Hodari D. and
Chesternut decisions.3 3 The Bostick Court considered whether police officers can board buses and ask questions of the passengers without violating
the Fourth Amendment. 3 In Bostick, two officers boarded a bus during a
layover in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida." 4 The officers displayed their badges and
one of them had a visible weapon. 4' Once on board, the officers asked to
42
see Bostick's identification and boarding pass, which were unremarkable.
The officers then asked to see Bostick's luggage and Bostick allowed them

129. Id. at 626.
130. Id. According to the Court, the common meaning of seizure is "a laying on of hands
or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful." Id.
131.
Id. The Court further noted:
Mere words will not constitute an arrest, while, on the other hand, no actual, physical touching is essential. The apparent inconsistency in the two
parts of this statement is explained by the fact that an assertion of authority and purpose to arrest followed by submission of the arrestee constitutes an arrest. There can be no arrest without either touching or submission.
Id. at 626-27 n.2 (quoting Perkins, The Law ofArrest, 25 IOWA L. REv. 201, 206 (1940)).
132.
Id. at 626.
133.
Id. at 627-28.
134.
Id. at 628.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 629.
138.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
139. Id. at 431.
140. Id.
141.
Id.
142. Id.
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to search the luggage.'4 3 The officers subsequently found contraband in the
luggage.'
At the conclusion of the fact summary, the Court noted that two
facts were particularly important.'45 First, the police advised Bostick that he
could refuse to cooperate and, secondly, the officers did not threaten Bostick
with a gun.'46 The Court then commenced its analysis by noting that a seizure does not occur when an officer simply approaches a citizen and asks
him questions. 47 The Court also explained that police may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, approach a citizen and ask to see personal identification or ask for permission to search luggage so long as the question
would not make a reasonable person think that the requests are mandatory. 4
Next, the Court dismissed Bostick's claim that the cramped confines
of a bus would make a reasonable person feel like he was not free to leave. "'
The Court explained that the "free to leave" test was not appropriate for this
case because the fact that a person would not want to exit the bus and risk
being left behind should not factor into the determination of the coerciveness
of the encounter. 5 ' The Bostick Court then compared the facts of Bostick to
the facts in Delgado.'' The Court explained that the fact that Bostick did
not feel free to leave, like the respondents in Delgado, was dependent upon a
Bostick did not want to leave
factor irrespective of the police presence.'
because he would miss the bus; Delgado and the other respondents did not
want to leave because they might have been fired.' 53 Therefore, according to
the Court, the correct test was not whether Bostick felt free to leave, but
to decline the officers'
whether a reasonable person would have felt ' "free
54
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."'

143. Id. at 432. There was some dispute as to whether Bostick consented to search and
whether he was informed of his right to refuse to consent. Id. The evidence, however, was
viewed in favor of the prosecution because "any conflict must be resolved in favor of the
state, it being a question of fact decided by the trial judge." Id.
144. Id. The state conceded that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify a seizure and that, if a seizure took place, the drugs found in Bostick's suitcase must be suppressed
as tainted fruit. Id. at 433-34.
145. Id. at 432.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 434.
148. Id. at 434-35.
149. Id. at 435. At this point in the discussion, the Supreme Court also noted that the
Florida Supreme Court had agreed with Bostick's argument strongly enough to create a per se
rule invalidating all searches on buses. Id. The Court also noted that the Florida court was
wrong in adopting this principle. Id.
150. Id. at 435-36.
Id. at 436.
151.
152. Id.
153.
Id.; INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984).
154.
Id. In announcing the appropriate test, the Bostick Court seemed to be relying on the
Chesternut variation of the Mendenhall test. Id. at 436-37. The Court noted:
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ConsensualSearches
The issue of consent not only applies to encounters with police, but
it also applies to searches that occur subsequent to the encounters.' 55 Consent becomes important in searches because searches conducted without a
warrant issued upon probable cause are per se invalid unless they are conducted under an established exception.' 56 Consent is one such exception that
allows law enforcement officials to conduct valid searches without a warrant.'57 One of the first cases to address the issue of consensual searches was
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 58
In Schneckloth, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the
definition of consent as it applies to Fourth Amendment searches.' 59 In other
words, the Court had to decide what the prosecutor must prove in order to
show that consent was voluntary." 6 In Scheckloth, a police officer pulled
over a car containing a driver and five passengers. 6' After determining that
the driver did not have a license, the officer had the men step out of the
car. "' The officer then asked if he could search the car and the men gave
him permission to do so.' 63 During the search, the officer found stolen
checks in the trunk."6
During a lengthy discussion, the Court recognized that in determining the test for consent two concerns must be balanced.'65 The first concern
is the need for consensual searches. 66 The second is the requirement of assuring the absence of coercion in acquiring consent to search.'67 The Court
also noted that it would be impractical, prior to requesting consent to complete a search, for policemen to inform citizens that they have the right to

This formulation follows logically from prior cases and breaks no new
ground. We have said before that the crucial test is whether, taking into
account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police
conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not
at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.
Id. (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988); California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621, 628 (1991)) (internal quotations omitted).
155.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations omitted).
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
159.
Id. at 219, 223.
160.
Id. at 223.
161.
Id. at 220.
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Id.
165.
Id. at 227.
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
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refuse to consent to the search.16 In conclusion, the Court determined that a
prosecutor must prove that consent was voluntary and not given under duress or coercion.' 69 However, as the Court explained, voluntariness is a
question of fact, and the prosecution need not show that the defendant had
knowledge that he could refuse to consent. 7 Nevertheless, the defendant's
knowledge regarding his ability to refuse to consent is a factor to be taken
into consideration. 7 Thus, in accordance with the standards it proffered, the
Court found that the consent given by the men in the car was voluntary.' 72
More recently, the Supreme Court addressed consensual searches in
Ohio v. Robinette.'73 In Robinette, the Court considered whether, under the
Fourth Amendment, a lawfully seized defendant must be advised he can
leave before his subsequent consent to a search will be considered voluntary.'74 The facts of the case indicated that Robinette was pulled over for
speeding.'75 After the officer gave Robinette a verbal warning, the officer
asked Robinette if he could search his car for guns or drugs.'76 Robinette
consented to the search. 177
The Court began its analysis by noting that "the touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," and reasonableness is measured by
the totality of the circumstances. 7 The Court further explained that it routinely rejects per se, or bright-line, rules. 7 Finally, the Court stated that a
per se rule like the one proposed before the Court was explicitly rejected in
Schneckloth.8 0 Therefore, the search of the car was consensual and the
driver did not need to be informed that he could withhold consent.''

168.
Id. at 231.
169. Id. at 248.
170.
Id. at 248-49
Id. at 249.
171.
172.
Id.
173.
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
174.
Id. at 35.
Id.
175.
176. Id. at 35-36.
177. Id. at 36.
178.
Id. at 39 (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).
179. Id. See also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (holding that the per se rule
adopted by the Florida Supreme Court was incongruent with the totality of the circumstances
test); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572 (1988) (noting that the bright-line test proposed by both parties "failed to heed [the] Court's clear direction that any assessment as to
whether police conduct amounts to a seizure ... must take into account all of the circumstances surrounding the incident"); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506-07 (1983) (White, J.,
plurality) (expressly rejecting any litmus-paper test or single sentence rule that would provide
the answers to any search and seizure consent issue).
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
180.
Id. at 39-40.
181.
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PRINCIPAL CASE

Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown, Jr., were convicted in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute.' 82 On appeal to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the convictions of Drayton and Brown
were reversed. 3 Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and determined that the District Court was correct in convicting Drayton and Brown, thereby overruling the Court of Appeals.8 4
The Eleventh CircuitPanelDecision
As noted above, Drayton and Brown were convicted separately in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distrib-

ute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.185 In a consolidated appeal, a three-member Eleventh Circuit panel, in a unanimous decision, reversed the convictions of Drayton and Brown and ordered the District Court
to grant the defendants' motion to suppress the cocaine found on their per6
8

sons.'

The Eleventh Circuit panel began its discussion by noting that the
court was there to decide "whether the consent given by each defendant for
the search was uncoerced and legally voluntary under the Fourth Amendment." 8 7 The court then stated that the case was controlled by its decision in
United States v. Washington, which extended United States v. Guapi, because the facts of the two cases were not distinguishable in any relevant
manner. 88 The Drayton panel adopted the reasoning from Washington and
subsequently reversed the convictions of Drayton and Brown.' 8 9 However,
182.
United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787, 788 (11th Cir. 2000).
183.
United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2002).
184. Id.
185. Id.; Drayton, 231 F.3d at 788.
186. Drayton, 231 F.3d at 791.
187. Id. at 788.
188. Id. at 790 (citing United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393 (11th Cir. 1998)). The facts of Washington are very
similar to the facts in Drayton. Washington, 151 F.3d at 1355-56. In Washington, law enforcement officials discovered drugs on the person of the defendant during a bus sweep in
Florida. Id. at 1356. Like in Drayton, the agents in Washington did not inform passengers of
their right to refuse to cooperate. Id. at 1355. Unlike in Drayton, however, they did make a
general announcement as to the purpose of their presence before they started questioning the
passengers. Id. Guapi also involved a bus search where the police made a general announcement before the police commenced the individual questioning of passengers. Guapi,
144 F.3d at 1396. However, as in Washington and Drayton, the police did not inform the
passengers of their right to refuse to consent. Id.
189. Drayton, 231 F.3d at 788. In Washington, the Eleventh Circuit panel concluded that
the facts and circumstances surrounding the search indicated that a reasonable person "would
not have felt free to disregard [the agents'] requests without some positive indication that
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in reaching the holding, the Drayton panel did make note of the insignificant
factual differences between Drayton and Washington.9 ' The panel dis-

cussed the distinctions in response to the government's argument that the
variations precluded a holding similar to Washington.'9'

The first factual difference was that in Washington the officers made
a general announcement regarding the purpose of their visit while in Drayton the officers addressed each passenger individually. 92 The court noted
that an individual show of authority is no less coercive than a general statement to all of the passengers. 93 A second factual difference in the case revealed that in Washington the officers asked to see the passengers' tickets
and personal identification while in Drayton they did not ask to see the tickets or personal identification.'9 4 Nevertheless, the court also ruled this difference to be insignificant.' 95 A third distinguishing fact indicated that in
Drayton an officer remained at the front of the bus during the questioning
process. 96 In Washington, however, only two officers were aboard the bus,
consent could have been refused." Washington, 151 F.3d at 1357. Therefore, the court reversed the conviction of the defendant. Id. In providing the holding, the Washington court
stated:
Although we reject the notion of a per se rule requiring bus passengers to
be informed of their constitutional rights, the facts and circumstances of
this search required some indication to passengers that their cooperation
was voluntary rather than mandatory. Because no such indication was
provided, and because a reasonable person traveling on this bus would not
have felt free to ignore the search request, we hold that this search was
unconstitutional.
Id. at 1355. The Washington court began its analysis by noting that the Bostick Court found
"it particularly worth noting" that the police advised Bostick he could refuse to cooperate. Id.
at 1356 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 432 (1991)). The Washington panel went on
to mention that per se rules are routinely rejected by the Supreme Court in the area of warrantless searches. Washington, 151 F.3d at 1357 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33
(1996); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435-37). Similarly, the court noted that the Supreme Court has
"rejected the notion that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse
when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search." Washington, 151 F.3d at
1357 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973)). On a final preliminary notation, the Washington panel explained that "if, by physical force or show of authority,
a reasonable citizen would not believe that he is free to ignore police questioning and go
about his business, he has been unconstitutionally seized." Washington, 151 F.3d at 1357
(citing Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). The Washington
panel then reasoned that the officer's general announcement and his showing of his badge at
the beginning of the sweep constituted a show of authority. Washington, 151 F.3d at 1357.
This show of authority, without a notice to the passengers that they could refuse to cooperate,
constituted a seizure. Id.
190. United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787, 790-91 (11th Cir. 2000).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 790.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 791.
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and both of whom moved to the back of the bus; no officers were standing at
the exit. 97 The panel noted that an officer standing at the front of the bus
would make a reasonable person feel less free to exit the bus and, therefore,
cut in favor of Drayton and Brown.198
The UnitedStates Supreme Court Decision
After the decision of the District Court was reversed and rehearing
en banc was denied, the government filed a petition for writ of certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court.'99 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether officers must advise bus passengers during these encounters of their right not to cooperate. 00 Justice Kennedy, who delivered the
majority opinion, began his analysis of the case with a discussion of some
foundation principles regarding Fourth Amendment consensual search and
seizure.2 ' The initial discussion noted that law enforcement officials may
approach individuals on the street or in public places and ask them questions
without violating the Fourth Amendment.2 2 The Court also mentioned that
law enforcement officers may ask questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage without any probable cause as long as they
do not coerce the individual to cooperate.2 3 Following this reasoning, the
Court stated that a person is seized only when a reasonable person would not
feel free to terminate the encounter. 2"
The Court next analyzed the case in light of its decision in Bostick, a
previous Supreme Court case involving drug interdiction efforts on buses.20 5
The Court began this discussion by noting that the Bostick decision made it
quite clear that per se rules regarding the Fourth Amendment are inappropriate. 2° Instead, as the Court noted, the "proper inquiry necessitates a consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the encounter. ,,207 The Cor
Court
also mentioned that the Bostick decision modified the rule set forth in California v. Hodari D., and the proper inquiry after Bostick "is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise

197.
Id.; United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354, 1355 (11 th Cir. 1998).
198.
United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787, 791 (11 th Cir. 2000).
199.
United States v. Drayton, 254 F.3d 1086 (11 th Cir. 2001); United States v. Drayton,
122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2002).
200.
United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2108 (2002).
201.
Id. at 2110.
202.
Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,497 (1983) (White, J., plurality)).
203. Id. (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991)).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2110-11. See generally Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (holding that a
consensual search is not invalid simply because it occurs on a bus). For a discussion of Florida v. Bostick, see supra notes 138-54 and accompanying text.
206.
United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (2002).
207. Id. at 2111 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439).
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terminate the encounter."2 °s Finally, the Court noted that although the Bostick Court did not indicate whether a seizure occurred, the Bostick Court did
identify two factors that were important.2" The first factor was that the officer did not remove his gun from his holster and the second factor was that
the officer notified the passenger of his right to refuse to cooperate.2
After acknowledging the two factors discussed in Bostick, the Court
then admonished the Eleventh Circuit for depending upon the second Bostick
factor to develop what was "in effect a per se rule that evidence obtained
during suspicionless drug interdiction efforts aboard buses must be suppressed unless the officers have advised passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to a search. 21 ' The Court then addressed the
cases that set up this standard: United States v. Guapi and United States v.
Washington.1 2 The Court concluded that the only common factor in each
case, including Drayton, was the fact that the police officers did not inform
3 Therefore,
the passengers that they had the right to refuse to cooperate.2
214
the Court held that this had in effect created a per se rule.
After reaching the conclusion that the Eleventh Circuit had created a
per se rule, the Court applied the Bostick framework to the Drayton facts to
2 5 The
decide if Brown and Drayton had been seized by the police officers.
6 The Court noted several
2
Court determined that they had not been seized.
facts that would indicate that a seizure had not occurred: (1) the officers
gave the passengers no reason to believe that they were required to answer
any questions; (2) Officer Lang did not brandish a weapon; (3) Officer Lang
did not make any intimidating movements; (4) the aisle was left open so
passengers could exit the bus; (5) Officer Lang spoke to the passengers one
by one in a polite, quiet voice; (6) there were no threats or commands; and
(7) Officer Lang did not say anything that would indicate to a reasonable
21 7
person that he was not free to leave the bus or terminate the encounter.
The Court went on to state that there is no doubt "that had this encounter
occurred on a street, it would have been constitutional," and just because the
Id. (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)). The rule cited by the
208.
Drayton Court, as set forth in Hodari D., stated that a seizure does not occur so long as a
reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business. Hodari
D., 499 U.S. at 628. The HodariD. rule was seemingly adopted from Chesternut. Id. at 628
(citing Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)).
209. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. at 2111.
210. Id.
Id.
211.
212. Id. at 2111 (citing United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393 (11th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998)).
213. Id. at 2112.
214. Id.
215. Id.
Id.
216.
Id.
217.
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encounter takes place on a bus does not automatically transform the standard
police questioning into an illegal seizure.2" 8
The Court next addressed Brown's and Drayton's claims regarding
the seizure. 2 9 The first claim made by the respondents asserted that Officer
Lang displaying his badge served as a show of authority that would preclude
the passengers from feeling free to leave or disregard the officers. 220 The
Court dismissed this claim by pointing to previous decisions in Florida v.
Rodriquez and INS v. Delgado, cases where the Court found no seizures had
occurred even though the officers had displayed badges when questioning
the defendants.22 The Court went on to mention that uniforms and sidearms,
like badges, are not enough to create a seizure. 22 In fact, the Court stated
that uniforms are reassuring and not disconcerting.2 The Court also explained that sidearms only become coercive if the gun is unholstered and the
officer is brandishing the weapon. 2 4
Next, the Court analyzed whether the presence of Officer Hoover at
the front of the bus created a coercive environment that would yield a seizure.22 The Court did not feel that this fact would make a reasonable person
feel like he could not leave the bus or terminate the encounter.2 6 The Court
compared the facts of Drayton to the facts in Delgado, a case where no seizure occurred even though officers were positioned at the exits of a factory
while other officers questioned workers.227 The Court also noted that the
small number of passengers who refuse to cooperate during the bus searches
does not create a presumption that a reasonable person does not feel free to
leave or ignore the officers during a bus sweep. 2 8 In fact, the Court stated
that people cooperate because they know that cooperation with the police
will enhance their own safety and the safety of others. 229 The Court also
218.
Id.
219. Id. at 2112-13.
220. Id. at 2112.
221.
Id. (citing Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210, 212-13 (1984)).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224.
Id.
225.
Id. at 2112-13.
226.
Id.
Id. (citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 219 (1984)). The Delgado Court noted:
227.
The presence of agents by the exits posed no reasonable threat of detention to these workers while they walked throughout the factories on job
assignments. Likewise, the mere possibility that they would be questioned if they sought to leave the buildings should not have resulted in
any reasonable apprehension by any of them that they would be seized or
detained in any meaningful way.
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 219.
228. United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2002).
229. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol3/iss1/8

20

Crago: Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure - Consensual Encounter or Coe

2003

CASE NOTE

stated that Drayton's consent was not involuntary just because the officers
previously arrested Brown. 230 The Court noted that the "arrest of one person
23
does not mean that everyone around him has been seized by the police." '
The Court pointed out that the arrest should have put Drayton on notice that
consent would lead to adverse consequences. 232
After deciding that an illegal seizure had not occurred, the Court
analyzed the issue of an unreasonable search.233 Initially, the Court acknowledged that this analysis would deal with the same facts as the seizure
issue.13' Not surprisingly, the Court discussed the fact that the respondents
answered in the affirmative when Officer Lang asked if he could search their
bag.23 The Court also noted that when Officer Lang asked to search the
respondents' persons, they allowed him to complete the pat down search.236
The Court continued the unreasonable search analysis by noting that it "has
rejected in specific terms the suggestion that police officers must always
inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a
warrantless consent search. '237 Instead, as the Court explained, it is the totality of the circumstances that determines if a seizure has occurred, and a
presumption of invalidity does not arise because a citizen consents to a
search without the police giving the citizen a warning that he may refuse to
cooperate.23 8
The Court concluded the unreasonable search analysis by explaining
that since Officer Lang asked for permission to search the defendants' bag
and persons, and the totality of the circumstances revealed that consent was
voluntary, then the searches were reasonable.239 With this conclusion and
the conclusion reached in the seizure analysis, the Court established that
there will be no instance where a warning will be automatically required for
a consensual encounter to pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny.240
The Dissent
Justice Souter, writing for the dissent, began the opinion by stating
that there are no justifications for subjecting passengers of bus or train travel

230. Id.
Id.
231.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2114.
Id. at 2112-14.
240.
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to the same safety precautions as passengers of air travel.24 ' Thus, as the
dissent explained, the majority's opinion has an "air of unreality" because
bus passengers most likely do not consent to searches to enhance safety.242
The dissent then began its analysis by noting that the issue on appeal is
"whether the police's examination of the bus passengers, including respondents, amounted to a suspicionless seizure under the Fourth Amendment."243
If the examination was a seizure, as the dissent noted, then any consent was
invalid as a product of an illegal seizure. 2" The dissent then explained that
Floridav. Bostick established the framework for deciding if a bus passenger
had been seized during a bus sweep.245 The determining test posed by Bostick, according to the dissent, is whether a reasonable person being questioned would have felt free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. 6
Before continuing the analysis, the dissent set forth some hypotheticals to provide perspective into the analysis.
A perfect example of police conduct that supports no colorable claim of seizure is the act of an officer who simply goes
up to a pedestrian on the street and asks him a question. A
pair of officers questioning a pedestrian, without more,
would presumably support the same conclusion. Now consider three officers, one of whom stands behind the pedestrian, another at his side toward the open sidewalk, with the
third addressing questions to the pedestrian a foot or two
from his face. Finally, consider the same scene in a narrow
alley.247
As the dissent noted, one may not be able to say that a seizure occurred in
the hypotheticals, but one may be able to say that the encounters were significantly different. 24' Therefore, as the dissent explained, by the final hypothetical a person may feel the "threatening presence of several officers. 249
The dissent noted further that police have legitimate authority and can exercise their power without an immediate check, which leads to an imbalance of
power when several officers are questioning one civilian.2 0 Before return-

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
(1980)
250.

Id. at 2114 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2114-15. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2115 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554
(Stewart, J., plurality)).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol3/iss1/8

22

Crago: Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure - Consensual Encounter or Coe

2003

CASE NOTE

ing to the analysis, the dissent made one final notation.25 The dissent stated
that the majority failed to display any understanding of the fact that the display of police power can rise to a level that will override a person's ability to
act freely. 52
2
The dissent returned to the analysis with a summary of the facts. "
The dissent concluded from the facts that the bus sweep was not consensual
and would continue with or without the passengers' cooperation.2 54 In fact,
the dissent explained, no reasonable passenger would have believed that he
had a free choice to ignore the police. 2" The dissent then compared the
Drayton facts to the hypothetical where three officers were questioning a
256
citizen in a narrow alley and telling him that his cooperation was expected.
The dissent followed this comparison by stating that although there may be
some bus questioning that will pass the Bostick test without providing passengers with a warning, the facts in Drayton require more than what was
provided.257

Finally, the dissent contested the majority's reliance on INS v.
Delgado.2 ' First, the dissent distinguished Delgado by noting that in
Delgado, the Court considered an order granting summary judgment and,
therefore, the facts had to be read in favor of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 259 Next, the dissent noted that in Delgado the workers continued about their business during the questioning, while Drayton and Brown
were stuck in their seats. 2' Furthermore, as the dissent stated, the bus was
would tend to his usual business until the
going nowhere and no passenger
26
so.
do
to
him
allowed
officers
ANALYSIS

In United States v. Drayton, the United States Supreme Court attempted to create an appropriate balance between protecting individual
rights and freedoms and protecting public interests by shielding law enforcement powers and abilities. By reducing individual rights and freedoms
in favor of enlarging law enforcement powers, the holding reached by the

Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
251.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
252.
253. Id. at 2115-16 (Souter, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 2116 (Souter, J., dissenting).
255. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
256. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
257. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2117 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984)).
258.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Delgado, 466 U.S. at 214; Delgado,466 U.S. at 221
259.
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
260. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
261.
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Court in Drayton presents several issues for review. 262 The first issue is
whether Drayton has lessened the protection that the Fourth Amendment
was intended to provide. The second issue is whether the totality of the circumstances test as applied in Drayton set forth an unrealistic result. The
final issue relates to the effect of the events of September 11, 2001, on the
Court's decision.
Intended Fourth Amendment Protection
Although there is a need for a balance between government and individual interests, the interdiction efforts taking place on interstate buses
seem to have gone too far.2 63 Bus searches, like the one in Drayton, are "inconvenient, intrusive, and intimidating" to the common passenger of an interstate bus.2" By allowing such searches, the decision in United States v.
Drayton has lessened the protection of privacy the Framers intended the
Fourth Amendment to provide.2 65 Furthermore, by allowing law enforcement to use illegal seizures to gather evidence, the Drayton decision fails to
262. See James Spallino, Jr., The Searchfor the Fourth Amendment Seizure: It Won't Be
Found On a Bus - Floridav. Bostick, 25 AKRON L. REv. 457, 477 (1991) (noting that Bostick

expanded the police conduct that does not amount to a seizure).
263. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 443-44 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 788-89 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd, 921 F.2d 1294
(D.C. Cir. 1990)) (noting that "the random indiscriminate stopping and questioning of individuals on interstate buses seems to have gone too far"); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (noting the need to balance the necessity for consensual searches and
the requirement of assuring the absence of coercion in acquiring such results). In Bostick,
Justice Marshall also commented that the balancing interests did not justify the bus interdiction practices when he stated:
In my view, the Fourth Amendment clearly condemns the suspicionless,
dragnet-style sweep of intrastate or interstate buses. Withdrawing this
particular weapon from the government's drug-war arsenal would hardly
leave the police without any means of combating the use of buses as instrumentalities of the drug trade. The police would remain free, for example, to approach passengers whom they have a reasonable, articulable
basis to suspect of criminal wrongdoing. Alternatively, they could continue to confront passengers without suspicion so long as they took simple steps, like advising the passengers confronted to their right to decline
to be questioned, to dispel the aura of coercion and intimidation that pervades such encounters. There is no reason to expect that such requirements would render the Nation's buses law-enforcement-free zones.
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 450 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
264. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 442 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Chandler,
744 F. Supp. 333, 335 (D.D.C. 1990)).
265. See id. at 443-44 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that "if the Court
approves such [drug interdiction] bus stops and allows prosecutions to be based on evidence
seized as a result of such stops, then we will have stripped our citizens of basic Constitutional
protections." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Lewis, 728 F. Supp. at 788-89). Justice
Marshall also noted that the majority's reasoning in Bostick "borders on sophism and trivializes the values that underlie the Fourth Amendment." Bostick, 501 U.S. at 450 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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protect individuals of this country from unjustifiable intrusions by the government into individual privacies. 2 6
When analyzing constitutional issues, the legal profession must recall the origin of constitutional liberties.2 67 As noted above, the authors of
the Constitution added the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because they:
[S]ought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.268
More specifically, the Fourth Amendment was added to protect the people of
this country from governmental intrusions similar to the British general warrant. 269 As one commentator noted:
The British general warrant was a search tool employed
without limitation on location, and without any necessity to
precisely describe the object or person sought. British authorities were simply given license to break into any shop or
place suspected wherever they chose. With that kind of unfettered discretion, the general warrant could be, and often
was, used to intimidate.... In the colonies, complaints that
royal officers were violating the privacy of colonists through
the use of writs of assistance, equivalent to general warrants,
grew. Because English law did not, as yet, recognize a right
of personal privacy, the crown's abuses in the colonies were
266.

Bostick, 501 U.S. at 444 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall further stated:
If passengers on a bus passing through the Capital of this great nation
cannot be free from police interference where there is absolutely no basis
for the police officers to stop and question them, then the police will be
free to accost people on our streets without any reason or cause.

Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Lewis, 728 F. Supp. at 788-89).
United States v. Cothran, 729 F. Supp. 153, 157-58 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd United
267.
States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In Cothran, a case with facts nearly identical to Drayton, the United States Federal District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that
the passenger did not consent to the encounter or the search; therefore, the passenger had been
seized. Cothran, 729 F. Supp. at 154-58.
268. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 646 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
William C. Banks and M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority For National Security
269.
Surveillance,50 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 2 (2000).
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not remediable at law. It was thus no surprise that the new
American Constitution and the government it created would
respect a series of individual freedoms .... For the new nation, warrants would require specificity to physically invade
the privacy of its citizenry.270
In scrutinizing the Drayton facts in a historical light, the police practice of drug and weapon interdiction upon buses is strikingly similar to the
British general warrant practices that occurred in the days prior to American
" ' Those
independence.27
are the same general warrants that prompted the
inclusion of the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.272 As Justice Marshall noted in Bostick, bus searches, like the one in Drayton, "evoke[] images of other days, under other flags, when no man traveled his nation's
roads or railways without fear of unwarranted interruption, by individuals
'
who held temporary power in the Government."273
Consequently, by allowing such bus interdiction practices to continue, Drayton fails to provide the
protection the Framers intended.274
The Reasonable Person Under the Circumstances Test
The result in United States v. Drayton is congruent with the Fourth
Amendment consensual encounter and consensual seizure precedent. Drayton followed the precedent of Terry, Mendenhall, and Bostick in its application of the "reasonable person under the circumstances test." 275 Though the
decision in Drayton is not surprising, it is disappointing. Drayton provided
the Court with an opportunity to depart from the continual misapplication of
the reasonable person consensual encounter test. However, the Drayton
Court declined the opportunity to correct the misconceptions of previous
276
decisions and promulgated another unrealistic result.
Terry set forth the original consensual encounter test. Under the
test, a citizen was seized by a police officer when the officer, by means of
270. Id. at 2-3 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
271.
Cothran, 729 F. Supp. at 157.
272. Id.
273. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 443 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1158 (Fla. 1989)).
274. See United States v. Felder, 732 F. Supp. 204, 209 (D.D.C. 1990) (noting that bus
interdiction practices do not meet the requirements of the Constitution). In Felder,a man was
arrested for possession of cocaine. Id. at 206. The man was arrested after police searched his
bag during a bus interdiction stop. Id. Ultimately, the court found the evidence the product
of an illegal seizure and inadmissible. Id. at 209.
275.
United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110-14 (2002).
276.
Id. at 2114 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that there is an air of unreality about the
Court's explanation of consensual searches on busses). See also Michael J. Reed, Jr., Florida
v. Bostick: The Fourth Amendment Takes a Back Seat to the Drug War, 27 NEw ENG. L.
REv. 825, 846 (1993) ("The majority opinion in Bostick makes a strained and unrealistic
interpretation of the circumstances surrounding Bostick's consensual search.").
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physical force or show of authority, in some way restrained the liberty of the
27
Under
citizen.277 Mendenhall further defined a consensual encounter.
Mendenhall, a citizen was not seized if all of the circumstances surrounding
the incident indicated that a reasonable person would have believed he was
free to leave.279 Finally, Bostick altered the test in the case of bus searches
280
by using a standard promulgated in Delgado, Chesternut, and Hodari D.
Bostick held that, in analyzing consensual encounters in circumstances similar to bus searches, the test is whether a reasonable person would have felt
28
free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.
The majority in Drayton took the analysis one step further. The majority
held that police do not have to notify citizens of their right to refuse to cooperate because nothing about drug interdiction efforts on buses would "suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was barred from leaving the bus or
282
otherwise terminating the encounter. ' '
Although the Court bases its tests on the reasonable person, the person the Court uses as the standard is anything but reasonable. As one commentator noted, "The Supreme Court's doctrine is flawed in conception by
its use of the reasonable person standard, and its picture of a reasonable person is simply out of touch with societal reality. Briefly put, most people
have neither the knowledge nor the fortitude to terminate unwanted interactions with the police. '283 The United States Supreme Court fails to realize
that most citizens are not conscious of the fact that they can refuse to consent. "[A] passenger unadvised of his rights and otherwise unversed in constitutional law has no reason to know that police cannot hold his refusal to
cooperate against him." ' ' In holding that law enforcement officers do not

277. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,19 n.16 (1968).
278. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., plurality).
plurality).
279. Id. (Stewart, J.,
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-40 (1991).
280.
Id. at 436.
281.
United States v. Drayton, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 2112 (2002).
282.
Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreal283.
ity, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 507, 521-22 (2001). The author also noted:
[T]he consensual encounter doctrine paints a false picture of reality as applied to encounters involving investigation of the individual being questioned. In so doing, it mislocates the dividing line between freedom and
restraint, including on the freedom side of this line many people who are
effectively restrained or - to put it another way - are restrained in all but
the eyes of the law. This price alone should be enough to compel reform.
Id. at 561-62.
284. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 447 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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have to notify bus passengers of their right to refuse to consent, the majority
ignores this fact. 85
The Court also failed to comprehend that, even if they are armed
with knowledge, most citizens lack the resiliency to tell the police "no." '86
When outnumbered by the police, a citizen can be made to feel powerless. 87
The pressure that police exert on a civilian can rise to a "threatening"
level. 8 8 The pressure can be so great that it "may overbear a normal person's ability to act freely, even in the absence of explicit commands or the
formalities of detention."289 The dissenters in Drayton also made note of the
inherent power of police officers when they stated:
The police not only carry legitimate authority but also exercise power free from immediate check, and when the attention of several officers is brought to bear on one civilian the
imbalance of immediate power is unmistakable. . . . As
common as this understanding is, however, there is little
sign of it in the Court's opinion.29 °
The Drayton majority also fails to recognize that a citizen who exercises his constitutional rights and refuses to cooperate may actually make the

285.
Drayton, 122 S. Ct. at 2112. Although Drayton disavowed the requirement that bus
passengers be advised of their right to refuse to cooperate prior to questioning, the United
States Supreme Court has previously suggested such procedures for officers engaged in consensual encounters. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504 (1983) (White, J., plurality). In
Royer, the Court noted that "by returning his ticket and driver's license, and informing him
that he was free to go if he so desired, the officers may have obviated any claim that the encounter was anything but a consensual matter from start to finish." Id. (White, J., plurality).
286.
See Craig M. Bradley, The Court's Curious Consent Search Doctrine, TRIAL, Oct.
2002, at 72. The author noted:
This argument ignores the coerciveness of such a police request - regardless of innocence or guilt - and argues for the advisory requirement. One
cannot assume that innocent people welcome such intrusions. If they are
truly glad to cooperate in such police endeavors, they will do so when informed that they don't have to. This would ensure that they are cooperating freely rather than acceding to police pressure ....
If someone has
been illegally stopped or arrested, the situation is not any more coercive
than if she had been legally detained.
Id. at 73-74.
287. United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
288. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554
(1980) (Stewart, J., plurality).
289.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
290.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). See also Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (Stewart, J., plurality) (noting that the threatening presence of several officers was an example of a circumstance
that might constitute a seizure even if the citizen did not attempt to leave the presence of the
officers).
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"'
In United States v.
police suspicious and prolong the investigation.29
"a passenger who
that
testified
interdiction
bus
conducting
officer
an
Felder,
simply for
suspicious
considered
be
refused to consent to an interview might
InterdicNarcotic
refusing to consent and, therefore, some members of the
tion Unit might notify authorities at the next stop and provide a description
of the uncooperative passenger."29' 2 If this police practice were known to the
general public, it alone would make a citizen feel like he had no choice but
to cooperate.293

The majority in Drayton was also mistaken when it compared bus
interdiction to a consensual encounter on the street. The majority noted that
"[i]t is beyond question that had this encounter occurred on the street, it
would be constitutional. The fact that the encounter takes place on a bus
does not on its own transform standard police questioning of citizens into an
illegal seizure."2' 94 Although this comparison is stated in light of the reasonable person standard, it actually gives no consideration to the view of the
reasonable person.295 A reasonable person would recognize the differences

See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 447 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting
291.
that "in light of intimidating show of authority that the officers made upon boarding the bus"
a reasonable person could believe that a refusal to cooperate would "only arouse the officers'
suspicions and intensify their interrogation"); United States v. Cothran, 729 F. Supp. 153, 156
(D.D.C. 1990), rev'd United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that
refusal to cooperate is sometimes treated as an admission of guilt); United States v. Felder,
732 F. Supp. 204, 208 (D.D.C. 1990) (noting that refusal to cooperate may lead to further
scrutiny and questioning at every bus stop).
292. Felder, 732 F. Supp. at 208. See also Cothran, 729 F. Supp. at 156. In Cothran, the
police officer conducting bus searches testified "that if a passenger refuses to permit a search
of his or her bags or claims not to have identification, he might be suspicious and, depending
on the conversation with the passenger, would notify authorities at the next stop that he suspected the passenger of carrying drugs." Id.
Felder, 732 F. Supp. at 208 ("Any reasonable person would feel less than free to
293.
refuse a police search if aware that refusal to cooperate would lead to repeated harassment.").
See also Andrea K. Mitchell, United States v. Drayton: Supreme Court Upholds Standards
For Police Conduct DuringBus Searches, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1065, 1073 (2002) ("The practical effect of Drayton ... could be a future alteration in police tactics in light of the Court's
decision to afford officers broad latitude in conducting consensual searches."). Mitchell also
noted that "some members of the criminal defense community contend that [Drayton] invites
law enforcement agents to engage in more aggressive search tactics in arenas beyond public
transportation." Id. at 1078.
United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2112 (2002).
294.
295. See Bostick v. State, 510 So. 2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (Letts, J., dissenting).
In his dissent, Judge Letts noted:
[M]y version of common sense tells me that a paid and ticketed passenger
will not voluntarily forfeit his destination and get up and exit a bus in the
middle of his journey, during a temporary stopover, while two policemen,
one with a pouched gun in his hand, are standing over him in a narrow
aisle asking him questions and requesting permission to search his luggage. It is not a question of whether he actually was free to leave, as all
of us trained lawyers know he was. The test is whether a layman would
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between an encounter on the street and an encounter on a bus. As Justice
Marshall noted:
Unlike a person approached by the police on the street, or at
a bus or airport terminal after reaching his destination, a
passenger approached by the police at an intermediate point
in a long bus journey cannot simply leave the scene and repair to a safe haven to avoid unwanted probing by law enforcement officials. The vulnerability that an intrastate or
interstate traveler experiences when confronted by the police outside of his own familiar territory surely aggravates
the coercive quality of such an encounter.296
The first difference between an encounter on a bus and an encounter
on the street involves a monetary relinquishment. A passenger on a bus may
have to make financial sacrifices to exert his constitutional right to refuse.
By leaving the bus, the passenger may forfeit his ticket and be forced to purchase another pass. Most passengers would see this as an inhibition to refusing to cooperate.297 The second difference between street encounters and bus
encounters is that a passenger on a bus is more likely to feel as though the
bus is not going anywhere unless he cooperates with the police.298 A third
difference reveals that a passenger may feel that he is unable to leave the bus
until he cooperates with the authorities.2 99 As the Washington court noted,
"Absent some positive indication that they were free not to cooperate, it is
doubtful a passenger would think he or she had the choice to ignore the police presence. Most citizens, we hope, believe that it is their duty to cooper-

reasonably be expected to believe he was free to leave under these circumstances. I conclude he would not.
Id. at 323 (Letts, J., dissenting).
296.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 448-49 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation and citations omitted).
297.
See id. at 448 (Marshall, J., dissenting ) (noting that a passenger would not leave the
bus to evade questioning because "the bus's departure from the terminal was imminent").
298.
See Drayton, 122 S. Ct. at 2117 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The bus was going nowhere,
and with one officer in the driver's seat, it was reasonable to suppose no passenger would
tend to his own business until the officers were ready to let him."); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 442
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that bus sweeps hold up the progress of the bus).
299.
See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 448 (Marshall, J.,dissenting) (noting that leaving the bus
would not appear to be an available option when the passenger would have to "squeeze past
the gun-wielding inquisitor who was blocking the aisle of the bus"); United States v. Cothran,
729 F. Supp. 153, 156 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir.
1990) ("[A]n innocent passenger would not genuinely have felt free to leave."); United States
v. Felder, 732 F. Supp. 204, 208 (D.D.C. 1990) ("The passengers ... clearly had to believe
they could not leave the bus until they had acceded to the officers' requests and cooperated
with the interdiction program."); Bostick v. Florida, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. 1989) ("Under such circumstances a reasonable traveler would not have felt that he was free to leave or
that he was free to disregard the questions and walk away.").
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ate with the police. ''3' Nevertheless, a person on the street may feel more
inclined to leave the scene without cooperating with the officers. A person
on the street has more than one direction in which he may leave the scene.
A person on a bus has only one way to leave the questioning - straight down
the aisle and out the exit. Similarly, a person on the street does not have to
push his way past several officers, one of whom may be "guarding" the
door, to leave the scene. Although these differences seem small, they add up
to a large divergence in the coercive nature of an encounter on a bus and an
encounter on the street.3° '
The United States Supreme Court has even recognized differences
between street encounters and bus encounters. 0 2 In Mendenhall, the Court
held that a person was seized if a reasonable person in the same circumstance would not feel "free to leave. ' 30 3 The Bostick Court, however, realized that there were some differences between street encounters and bus
encounters - i.e., a bus passenger may not want to leave because he would
miss his bus. 3' Therefore, Bostick changed the analysis from "free to leave"
to "free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter., 305 The Drayton Court subsequently followed the Bostick application of
the consensual encounter test with blind adherence. Nevertheless, the unreasonable application of the test for encounters on buses continually fails to
adequately protect the rights of a bus passenger.30 6 In effect, the Drayton
decision better protects the constitutional rights of a person on the street than
of a person on a bus.
The Effect of CurrentEvents on the Decision in United States v. Drayton
The events of September 11, 2001, changed the United States of
America. The nation is now aware that there is not a barrier around the border of the country that protects us from the evils of terrorism. The Justices,
along with the rest of the country, realize that we will need protection from
terrorism for a long time to come. In light of this realization, the Court may
have let apprehensions of future events affect the reasoning of the Drayton
decision.3 7 In fact, the dissent seems to allude to the presence of such
300.
United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354, 1357 (1 1th Cir. 1998). For a discussion
of United States v. Washington, see supra notes 188-89.
301.
See United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393, 1395 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that "the
cramped confines of a bus create an environment uniquely susceptible to coercive police
tactics").
302.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (analyzing the differences between
encounters that occur on a street and encounters that occur on a bus).
303.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., plurality).
304. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.
305.
Id. at 438.
306.
For a discussion of the misapplication of the consensual encounter test, see supra
notes 275-305 and accompanying text.
307.
See Mitchell, supra note 293, at 1076-77 ("[M]uch of the media attention given to
Drayton focused on how the Court would, in the wake of the terrorist attacks, balance the
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thoughts in the majority's reasoning when it noted that "[a]nyone who travels by air today submits to searches of the person and luggage as a condition
of boarding the aircraft. It is universally accepted that such intrusions are
necessary to hedge against risks that, nowadays, even small children understand.""'
Therefore, it is possible that the Court, in an effort to prevent terrorism, did not want to lessen the ability of law enforcement officials to search

for contraband, especially weapons of mass destruction.3"

A ruling that

required informed consent on buses would have lessened the ability of law
enforcement to protect the general public.31 A ruling requiring informed
consent on buses could also be read to require informed consent on airplanes.3"' Because it would lessen the ability of law enforcement, this is
definitely a rule the Court would like to avoid if it is apprehensive about the
threat of terrorism.
Nevertheless, public interests should not override individual interests simply because the country is recovering from the tragic events of
September 11, 2001. As one commentator noted:
Most critically, we must oppose the fatalism that has captured the minds and hearts of too many Americans. We
should reject the premise that after September 11 we can no
longer afford the privacy or freedom that we previously enjoyed. The United States has survived world war, presidential assassination, domestic riots, and economic depression.
We have had nuclear weapons targeted on the nation's capital by foreign adversaries for much of the twentieth century.
But none of these developments has required a permanent
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures with the need for public safety on interstate
transportation.").
308
United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2114 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
309. See Carrie L. Groskopf, If It Ain 't Broke, Don't Fix It:The Supreme Court's Unnecessary Departure From Precedent in Kyllo v. United States, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 201, 204
(2002) (noting that the United States Supreme Court will be very deferential to police measures that are needed to the prevent terrorism). See also Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy
After September 11, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1115, 1116 (2002) (noting that September 11 will have
a profound impact on the decisions of the courts and that the courts have already shown new
deference to issues of national security).
310.
See Bradley, supra note 286, at 73. Bradley notes that if notice of the right to refuse
to consent is given, suspects would heed the advisory and refuse to cooperate. Id. Consequently, any possible evidence would be lost. Id.
311.
But see Drayton, 122 S.Ct. at 2114 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Drayton dissent
noted, "The commonplace precautions of air travel have not, thus far, been justified for
ground transportation, however, and no such conditions have been placed on passengers getting on trains or buses." Id. See also Mitchell, supra note 293, at 1077 ("[T]his distinction by
the dissent between air travel and ground travel may have signaled an emerging trend in
search and seizure law, where the legal analysis employed could depend on the mode of public transportation at issue.").
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sacrifice in the structure of liberty established by the Constitution or by law, or, specifically, a sacrifice of the individual's freedom to limit the oversight of the government....
We have a duty to safeguard privacy, to oppose secrecy,
and
3 12
to ensure the protection of constitutional freedom.
Although the Court may have been concerned about the possibility of terrorism, it cannot fail to protect our constitutional freedoms. It is "in
times of
31 3
crisis that hard-won liberties require the most careful protection."
CONCLUSION

Although the Court in United States v. Drayton tried to find an appropriate balance between the ever-competing public and private interests,
the majority should not be excused for lessening the protection the Fourth
Amendment was intended to provide. Furthermore, the majority's decision
should not be taken as well-reasoned. The Court, despite previously acknowledging that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, failed to accurately assess what constitutes a reasonable person in the
circumstances set forth in routine drug and weapon interdiction efforts on
buses. a The Court's application of the reasonable person standard creates a
person that is anything but reasonable. This reasonable person knows more
about his rights than most lawyers and is not afraid to assert his rights in the
face of intimidating law enforcement. Due to this unrealistic reasonable
person, the Court allows individual rights to be overrun by governmental
interests. Additionally, the events of September 11, 2001, and the possibility
of future catastrophes should not provide justification for the Drayton decision. "[T]he strictures of the Fourth Amendment are not mere technicalities,
but important constitutional safeguards that protect all citizens. Police practices must be designed to conform to the Fourth Amendment; a citizen's
constitutional rights cannot be twisted to conform to current police practices. '31 5
BARRY CRAGO

312. Rotenberg, supra note 309, at 1135.
313.
United States v. Cothran, 729 F. Supp. 153, 157-58 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd United
States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
314. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,
250 (1991)).
315. United States v. Felder, 732 F. Supp. 204, 209 (1990).
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LEGAL ETHICS - Stabbed in the Back, But No Adverse Effect,
Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002).
INTRODUCTION

On March 30, 1992, the body of 17-year-old Timothy Jason Hall
was found under a piece of plywood on a mattress in an abandoned building
along the James River in the City of Newport News, Virginia.' The autopsy
revealed that Hall, nude from the waist down, had been stabbed 143 times
and possibly sodomized. 2 His 14-year-old roommate, whom Hall had
dropped off at a party near the area where his body was later discovered, was
the last to see Hall alive on the night of March 28, 1992.' Youths outside the
building where the party took place saw a man, whom they later identified as
Walter Mickens, hiding in the bushes across the street." On April 4, 1992,
Mickens was arrested on unrelated charges in the area where Hall's body
was discovered.5 Overwhelming evidence against Mickens began to surface.6 Mickens made self-incriminating statements when the police questioned him about the murder of Timothy Hall.7 While incarcerated, Mickens
also made confessions to his cellmate about the sodomy and murder of
Timothy Hall.8 Analyses of the specimen taken from the scene were consistent with samples taken from Mickens. 9 Police also uncovered evidence that
Mickens had sold the shoes Hall was wearing the night of the murder to an-

other man for $5.00.'o With all the evidence against him, Mickens went on
trial."

1. Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586, 590-92 (E.D. Va. 1999) (citing Mickens v.
Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d 678, 681-83 (Va. 1994)).
2.
Id. at 590-91. Investigators discovered a white liquid next to Hall's anus, a pubic hair
on his buttock, and semen on the mattress. Id.
3. Id. at 590. At the time of his death, Hall was living with 14-year-old Raheem Gordon
and Gordon's father. Id.
4.
Id.
5. Id. at 591.
6.
Id.at 591-92.
7.
Id.at 591. When asked about the murder, Mickens denied involvement, stating, "You
didn't find any knife on me; did you?" Id. The fact that Hall had been stabbed had not been
revealed to Mickens. Id. When the warrant for his arrest on the charge of the murder of Hall
was given to Mickens, he stated that he accepted the charges. Id. When asked what he
meant, he stated, "[I]f I told you I accept the warrants that means I'm guilty, don't it?" Id.
8. Id. at 592. When asked by his cellmate why he was arrested, Mickens answered,
"They said I stabbed somebody 140 something times in the head.., which I did." Id. Mickens also stated that "they" said he also sodomized the victim, "which I did." Id.
9.
Id. at 591-92. The pubic hairs taken from Hall's body were "alike in all identifiable
microscopic characteristics to the pubic hair sample taken from Mickens." Id. at 591 (quotation and citation omitted). Mickens' DNA also matched the semen found on the mattress. Id.
at 591-92.
10.
Id. at 591.
11.
Id. at 590-92.
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At the time of Timothy Hall's murder, assault and concealed
weapons charges were pending against him in juvenile court.' Bryan Saunders was appointed on March 20, 1992, to represent Hall in the matter.' 3 A
hearing was scheduled for April 3, 1992, in the Newport News Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court. 4 Sometime between March 20 and Hall's disappearance on March 28, Saunders met with Hall for 15 to 30 minutes to discuss Hall's case.'" When Saunders arrived in court on Friday, April 3, to
defend Hall against the assault and concealed weapons charges, Saunders
was informed that Hall was dead and the charges had been dismissed. 6
Judge Aundria Foster of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court issued a
handwritten order on a single sheet of paper dismissing the charges against
Hall.' 7 The name of Bryan Saunders as counsel for Hall appeared on the
dismissal form.'" Mickens was arrested for Hall's murder the day after the
dismissal.' 9 Two days later, Judge Foster appointed counsel for Mickens.2"
She chose Bryan Saunders, the lawyer who three days earlier had been representing the murder victim.2 '
Bryan Saunders did not inform the court, his co-counsel, or Mickhe
had represented Hall at the time of his murder and had met with
that
ens
him in person during the previous two weeks.22 Judge Foster did not ask
23
Saunders if he would have a conflict of interest in representing Mickens.
Rather, without a word Saunders went on to represent Mickens through the
guilt and penalty phases of his trial.24 With the overwhelming evidence
against him, the jury convicted Walter Mickens of the capital murder of
Timothy Hall in the commission of attempted forcible sodomy and sentenced him to death.25
After exhausting all state appeals, Mickens petitioned for a federal
writ of habeas corpus in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on several
grounds, one of which was that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
Id. at 599. Hall's mother, Janet Heywood, swore out a warrant for assault and battery
12.
against Hall. Id. Hall allegedly grabbed his mother by the arms and "shoved her to the
ground." Id. Hall was later charged with carrying a concealed weapon when he was found
carrying a serrated bread knife in wrapped paper. Id.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Id. at 600.
16.
Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
17.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
See Mickens, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 599-600; Mickens v. Taylor 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1240
22.

(2002).
23.
24.
25.

Mickens, 240 F.3d at 354.
Id.
Mickens, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 590.
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due to Saunders' conflict of interest at trial.26 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that in order to establish a
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel, Mickens
must show an actual conflict of interest and an adverse affect on Saunders'
performance, neither of which were sufficiently demonstrated." The court
concluded that Judge Foster knew or should have known of the potential
conflict of interest when she appointed Saunders to defend Mickens.28 Her
failure to inquire however, did not merit a reversal of Mickens' conviction

without an independent showing of adverse effect.29 Accordingly, Mickens'
conviction was affirmed.3"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
the decision of the trial court.3 On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals
affirmed Mickens' conviction.32 The Court of Appeals in large part followed
the reasoning laid out by the District Court in holding that Judge Foster's
failure to inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which she knew or
should have known was error, but did not warrant a reversal.33 Instead,

Mickens had the burden of showing that Saunders was acting under an actual
conflict of interest that adversely affected his performance. 34 Like the Dis-

26.

Id. at 590, 593. The federal habeas corpus provision states in significant part:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000). The discovery that Saunders represented Hall at the time he was
murdered was quite accidental. Mickens, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 600. Mickens' counsel for federal
habeas corpus proceedings went to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court to review
Mickens' juvenile records. Id. Counsel asked for any files involving Timothy Hall. Id. The
clerk mistakenly produced Hall's confidential juvenile file. Id. Counsel recognized Saunders' name as defense counsel for Hall in the file. Id.
27.
Mickens, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 614-15.
28.
Id. at 614.
29.
Id. 610-15. The court heard evidence on adverse effect and found there was none in
this case. Id.
30.
Id. at 615-16.
31.
Mickens v. Taylor, 227 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 2000), rev'd 240 F. 3d 348 (4th Cir.
2001) (en banc). The court reasoned that according to Wood v. Georgia, it was unnecessary
to show an adverse effect when an actual conflict of interest existed and the trial court knew
or should have known of the conflict and failed to make an inquiry. Id. at 210-11. For a
discussion of Wood v. Georgia, see infra notes 121-41 and accompanying text. The court
found that the judge knew of the conflict of interest and that an actual conflict existed according to the Freundtest. Id. at 212-17. For a discussion of the Freundtest, see infra note 232.
Mickens was granted a new trial. Id. at 217.
32.
Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
33.
See id. at 357-60.
34.
Id. at 355-56.
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trict Court, the Court of Appeals held that Mickens had not sustained his
burden."
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on the
following issue: "[W]hat a defendant must show in order to demonstrate a
Sixth Amendment violation where the trial court fails to inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or reasonably should have
known."36 The Court held that the trial court's failure to inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or should have known did not
merit reversal unless the defendant could independently demonstrate that an
actual conflict adversely affected counsel's performance.37
This case note will discuss how the decision in Mickens v. Taylor
misinterprets the previous case law regarding conflicts of interest and effective assistance of counsel and creates a new burden on defendants to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation. This note will also address the policy
implications of Mickens v. Taylor and the significant impact the decision
may have on future defendants who endeavor to reverse a conviction based
on an attorney's conflict of interest. In addition, the effect of the decision on
conflict of interest law in Wyoming will be assessed. Finally, this note will
discuss the last section of the Mickens opinion, which foreshadows even
greater restrictions on the right to effective assistance of counsel by limiting
the applicability of the widely used Sullivan test.38
BACKGROUND

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
every person accused of a crime the right to have the counsel of an attorney.39 The Sixth Amendment states in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the assistance of counsel for his
defence."' Assistance of counsel is a fundamental right that preserves the
integrity of the justice system by assuring that verdicts are reliable.4 The
Supreme Court, throughout the twentieth century, endeavored to define the
scope of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel.42 Having asId. at 360.
35.
Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1239 (2002).
36.
Id. at 1245.
37.
38.
The Sullivan test states that prejudice to the defendant will be presumed if defense
counsel was operating under an actual conflict of interest and the conflict adversely affected
counsel's performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980); see infra notes 99-120
and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39.
40.
Id.
41.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
42.
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court held, in Powell v. Alabama, that the right
"to be heard would be... of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). The Court went on to say:
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sistance of counsel does not mean that the mere presence of an attorney will
suffice.43 Rather, "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance
of counsel."" In essence, to protect the constitutional rights afforded by the
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.
He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare
his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does
not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of
feeble intellect. If in any case, civil of [sic] criminal, a state or federal
court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by
and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the
constitutional sense.
Id. at 69. In 1938, the Court examined a case in which the defendants, accused of murder,
were never appointed counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 460 (1938). The Court held
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is protected "by providing counsel for an accused
who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty,
and whose life or liberty is at stake." Id. at 468. The Court emphasized the importance of
counsel:
The Sixth Amendment... embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious
truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill
to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his
life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and
learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex and mysterious.
Id. at 462-63.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court established that the right to counsel extends to
defendants accused of felonies who cannot afford an attorney to represent them. 372 U.S.
335, 343-44 (1963). The Court observed, "That government hires lawyers to prosecute and
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries." Id. at 344. In
McMann v. Richardson, the Court stated that the right to counsel is the right to "effective
assistance of competent counsel." 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). More specific to this case note,
the Court in Glasser v. United States found the right to assistance of counsel can be violated if
counsel is operating under a conflict of interest. 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). The Court stated,
"The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to
indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." Id. In
United States v. Cronic, the Court held that the right to effective assistance of counsel is "the
right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful
adversarial testing." 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984). All the surrounding circumstances must be
examined to "justify a presumption of ineffectiveness." Id. at 662.
43.
See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
44.
Id.
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Sixth Amendment, counsel must play "the role necessary to ensure that the
trial is fair."45
The Strickland Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington outlined the general test for effective assistance of counsel.46 In Strickland, the
defendant was accused of three brutal stabbing murders, kidnapping, torture,
assault, attempted murder, attempted extortion, and theft.47 Against the advice of counsel, the defendant confessed to the murders, waived his right to a
jury trial, and pleaded guilty to all three murder charges.4" At sentencing,
counsel advised the defendant to waive his right to a jury recommendation
on sentencing and presented no testimony to the judge, relying in part on the
trial judge's earlier statement that he respected those who "are willing to step
forward and admit their responsibility."49 The judge sentenced the defendant
to death.5" The defendant appealed the convictions alleging that defense
counsel was ineffective. 5
The Strickland Court held that "[t]he benchmark for judging any
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."52 The defendant must show two
elements before counsel's performance is deemed ineffective: (1) that counsel's performance was "deficient," and (2) that "the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense."53
The first element in Strickland necessary to prove a Sixth Amendment violation for ineffective assistance of counsel is to show that defense
counsel's performance was "deficient."54 The Strickland Court held that in
order for counsel's performance to avoid deficiency, counsel must provide
"reasonably effective assistance."5 5 That is, counsel must act as a reasonable
attorney under the circumstances.56 The Court was quick to add that no
more specific standard was necessary, as the lower court had held, because
the rule could easily become too cumbersome. 7 In addition, the Strickland
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 671-72.
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id. at 675.
Id.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 687.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 688-89; see Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982).
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Court held that a reviewing court should be highly deferential to the attorney's performance. 8 Deficient performance of counsel alone, however, is
not enough to reverse a conviction.
In addition to a deficient performance, the defendant must show that
the defense was prejudiced by counsel's performance or that some harm was
done by counsel's performance. The defendant must show that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different."'6 ° . If the defendant can show
both deficient counsel and prejudice, then there is sufficient evidence to
"undermine confidence in the outcome" and a reversal is warranted.6
There are some circumstances, however, that merit exceptions to the
Strickland prejudice test.62 In these situations the Sixth Amendment violation is so flagrant that prejudice is presumed.6 3 The most obvious is when
the defendant is denied any counsel at all. 64 The second is when "although
counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any
lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so
small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate ....
In the third circumstance, counsel "actively represented conflicting interests. 66 Although
prejudice is not automatically presumed in this case, the defendant has a
lesser burden than proving prejudice.6 7 Instead of establishing prejudice
through the court record, prejudice is presumed if counsel is burdened by an
actual conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance.68
The Court in Strickland wrote that such an exception is made when "counsel

58.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
59.
Id. at 687.
60.
Id. at 694.
61.
Id.
62.
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
63.
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658.
64.
Id. at 659. In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court held that Gideon's right to effective
counsel was violated when he was denied counsel to defend against felony charges. 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963).
65.
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60. The Cronic Court cites Powell v. Alabama as an example of this situation. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932)). In Powell, the judge appointed a lawyer to the defendants on the day of trial. 287
U.S. at 53-54. The Court held that "such designation of counsel as was attempted was ... so
close upon the trial as to amount to a denial of effective and substantial aid in that regard."
1d. at 53. In Cronic, new defense counsel was only allowed 25 days to prepare for trial, while
the government had four and one half years to prepare. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 649. The Court
held that the circumstances in Cronic were not sufficient to presume prejudice. Id. at 666.
66.
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 661 n.28 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980));
see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
67.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
68.
Id. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980)). To show prejudice the
defendant must prove that absent the errors of counsel, the outcome would have been different. Strickland,466 U.S. at 694.
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breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties."'69
The Court went on to state:
Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest
and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain
situations likely to give rise to conflicts ... it is reasonable
rigid rule
for the criminal justice system to maintain a fairly
70
interest.
of
conflicts
for
prejudice
of presumed
Conflict of Interest Cases
The first case to tackle the effect of a conflict of interest on the right
to effective assistance of counsel was Glasser v. United States in 1942. 7' In
Glasser, several government officials were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States government after they accepted money from individuals indicted for violating federal liquor laws in exchange for making the
charges "disappear. 72 At the time, Glasser was Assistant United States Attorney in charge of liquor cases in the Northern District of Illinois. 73 As the
case proceeded to trial, Kretske, one of Glasser's co-defendants, found himself without counsel. 74 The court suggested that Glasser's counsel step in to
defend Kretske. 75 Glasser objected, but after a long discussion the court
appointed Glasser's attorney to represent the interests of both defendants.76
Strickland,466 U.S. at 692.
69.
Id.
70.
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
71.
Id. at 63-64.
72.
Id. at 63
73.
74.
Idat 68.
Id.
75.
Id. at 68-69. The trial court, Glasser, and Glasser's counsel, Mr. Stewart, had the
76.
following discussion about Mr. Stewart representing Kretske:
Mr. Stewart: May I make this statement about that, judge? We were talking about it- we were all trying to get along together.... There will be
conversations here where Mr. Glasser wasn't present, where people have
seen Mr. Kretske and they have talked about, that they gave money to
take care of Glasser, that is not binding on Mr. Glasser, and there is a divergency there, and Mr. Glasser feels that if I would represent Mr. Kretske the jury would get an idea that they are together ....
The Court: How would it be if I appointed you as attorney for Kretske?
Mr. Stewart: That would be for your Honor to decide.
The Court: I know you are looking out for every possible legitimate defense there is. Now, if the jury understood that while you were retained by
Mr. Glasser the Court appointed you at this late hour to represent Kretske,
what would be the effect of the jury on that?
Mr. Stewart: Your Honor could judge that as well as I could.
The Court: I think it would be favorable to the defendant Kretske.
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On appeal, Glasser claimed that the conflicting interests his attorney
was forced to represent by order of the court denied him his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel." In reviewing the lower court's decision, the United States Supreme Court focused on the responsibility of the
trial court to safeguard the defendant's rights.7" "Upon the trial judge rests
the duty of seeing that the trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential
rights of the accused.... The trial court should protect the right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel."79 In this case, "The possibility of
the inconsistent interests of Glasser and Kretske was brought home to the
court, but instead of jealously guarding Glasser's rights, the court may fairly
be said to be responsible for creating a situation which resulted in the impairment of those rights.""° The Court found that Glasser's attorney failed to
cross-examine a vital witness and failed to object to inadmissible testimony
in his "struggle to serve two masters."8"
Having discovered a conflict of interest, the Court declined to speculate on the degree of prejudice caused by the conflict of interest, reasoning
that "[t]he right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial." 2 The Court was especially concerned
with the role the trial court played in creating the conflict of interest:
Of equal importance with the duty of the court to see that an
accused has the assistance of counsel is its duty to refrain
from.., even suggesting that counsel undertake to concurrently represent interests which might diverge from those of
his first client, when the possibility of that divergence is
brought home to the court.83
The Court held that "the [trial] court thereby denied Glasser his right to have
the effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,"
and ordered a new trial?'

Mr. Glasser: I think it would be too, if he had Mr. Stewart. That's the
reason I got Mr. Stewart, but if a defendant who has a lawyer representing
him is allowed to enter an objection, I would like to enter my objection. I
would like to have my own lawyer representing me.
Id.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 67.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 72-75.
Id. at 75-76.
Id. at 76
Id. No further decision was reported on remand.
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The next conflict of interest case to reach the Court was Holloway
v. Arkansas in 1978.85 In Holloway, defense counsel was appointed to defend three men accused of robbing a Little Rock, Arkansas, restaurant and
raping two of the female employees.86 Before trial, defense counsel moved
that separate counsel be appointed each defendant due to possible conflicts
of interest that could arise in defending all three defendants together. After
a hearing, the court refused to appoint separate counsel.8" Before the jury
was empaneled, defense counsel again moved for appointment of separate
counsel, arguing that in the event one of the defendants testified, counsel
would be unable to properly protect the rights of the others by crossexamining the defendant.8 9 The court again denied the motion.90 After the
prosecution rested its case, it became clear that against counsel's advice all
three defendants planned to testify. 9' Counsel again explained to the court
that he could not effectively represent the interests of all three defendants if
they took the stand.92 For a third time, the trial judge refused to appoint
separate counsel. 93
The Holloway Court held that "the failure, in the face of the representations made by counsel weeks before trial and again before the jury was
94
empaneled, deprived petitioners of the guarantee of assistance of counsel."
The Court cited Glasser and reasoned that the conflict of interest was
"brought home" to the court in this case by the formal motions and objections of defense counsel.95 The Court stated that to determine whether the
conflict of interest was "harmless error" would be difficult and speculative,
and that "assistance of counsel is among those constitutional rights so basic
to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error."9'
Thus, when "a trial court improperly requires joint representation over
timely objection reversal is automatic. 97 Holloway established the clear
rule that if defense counsel objects to multiple 98representation and the trial
court fails to inquire, the error warrants reversal.
Two years later, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Court addressed the issue
of an appropriate standard when the trial court did not know or had no rea85.

435 U.S. 475 (1978).

86.
87.
88.

Id.at 477.
Id.
Id.

89.

Id.
at 478.

90.
91.

Id.
Id.

92.
93.
94.

Id. at 478-79.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 484 (quotation omitted).

95.

Id. at 484-85.

96.

Id. at 489, 491 (quotations and citations omitted).

97.
98.

Id. at 488.
Id.
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son to know of a possible conflict of interest even though a conflict of interest probably existed. 9 Sullivan had been indicted along with two other men
for the murders of a teamster and his companion in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania." At the start of the litigation, separate counsel represented Sullivan."°1 After Sullivan could no longer afford his attorney, he accepted repre2
sentation by the two attorneys retained by the other defendants.0 Sullivan
went to trial first.0" The defense did not present a case on Sullivan's behalf
and rested at the close of the prosecution's case." Sullivan was convicted
of murder and sentenced to life in prison. 5 The other two defendants were
acquitted in subsequent trials."
Sullivan argued on appeal that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel due to his lawyer's conflicting interests. 0 7 This case was
different from Holloway because no formal objection was taken against representation by counsel, nor did any other circumstance exist that would have
"brought home" to the court that there was a potential conflict of interest."'
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Sullivan and held
that a reversal is merited if the defendant can make some showing "of prejudice or conflict of interest, however remote. . . ." Accordingly, the Third
Circuit court overturned Sullivan's conviction." 0
The Supreme Court held that the fact that the judge did not inquire
into a possible conflict of interest was not reversible error."' Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, first held that a trial judge has no affirmative duty to
inquire into whether there is a conflict of interest in a case of multiple representation unless "special circumstances" indicate it is necessary."' The
mere possibility of a conflict of interest, however, without any other revealing circumstances is not enough to necessitate an inquiry by the trial court."'
In Sullivan, the Court reasoned that because there were no special circumstances indicating the existence of a conflict of interest, the trial court had no
obligation to inquire.' '" In such case, to obtain a reversal the defendant must
show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected defense counsel's
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

446 U.S. 335 (1980).
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 338.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 347.
United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 524 (3rd Cir. 1979).
Id. at 523-24.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348.
Id. at 346-47.
Id. at 348, 350.
Id. at 347.
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performance."' The Court did not in this case clearly define actual conflict
or adverse effect." 16
Justice Marshall's dissent criticized the majority's assessment of the
inherent danger of conflicts of interest in cases of multiple representations. 117
Justice Marshall reasoned that the potential for a conflict of interest in cases
of multiple representation was so "grave" that the trial court should have a
duty to inquire in every case."' Justice Marshall felt the better test should be
that, absent an objection at trial, the defendant should have to show only that
an actual conflict of interest existed, and not that it adversely affected defense counsel." 9 Justice Marshall opined that the burden of proving that an
actual conflict of interest adversely affected defense counsel's performance
is "not only unduly harsh, but incurably speculative as well."' 2 °
Less than a year after Sullivan was decided, the Court decided Wood
v. Georgia, in which the trial court knew or should have known of a conflict
of interest, but failed to inquire.' Justice Powell again wrote the majority
opinion.'22 The defendants in Wood were employees of the Plaza Theatre
and Bookstore, an adult establishment in Atlanta, Georgia. 2 3 Each defendant was charged with and convicted of two counts of distributing obscene
materials in violation of title 26, section 2101, of the Georgia Code. 24 The
defendants each received fines of $5,000 and 12-month jail sentences, suspended on the condition that the defendants paid the fines at $500 a
month. 125 The defendants believed their employer would pay the fines; however, the employer failed to do so.' 26 After three months, the court held a
hearing in which it denied the defendants' motion to reduce the fines due to
their inability
to pay and ordered the defendants to serve the remaining jail
27
sentences.1

115.
Id.at348.
116. For a discussion of the definitions of "conflict of interest" and "adverse effect," see
infra note 232.
117. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 354 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 355-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 355 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272 (1981). The proceeding in which the trial court
should have known of the conflict of interest was not the defendants' trial itself, but the probation revocation hearing. Id. The Court does indicate, however, that the conflict of interest
could have been recognized as early as the trial. Id. at 268, 272.
122. Id. at 262.
123. Id. at 263.
124. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101 (1978). The Georgia obscenity statute read in part, "A
person commits the offense of distributing obscene materials when he ...exhibits or otherwise disseminates to any person any obscene material." Dyke v. State, 209 S.E.2d 166, 173
(Ga. 1974) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101 (1974)).
125. Wood, 450 U.S. at 263.
126. Id. at 266-67.
127. Id. at 264.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of "whether it is
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause to imprison a probationer
solely because of his inability to make installment payments on fines.' 28
The Court, however, decided that the case could not be heard on that issue
because defense counsel possibly represented conflicting interests at trial
and at the probation revocation hearing.129 The defendants understood their
employer would pay their legal fees and pay any fines they incurred as a
result of their employment with the Plaza Theatre and Bookstore. 3 The
defendants' employer hired defense counsel as agreed, but failed to pay their
fines.' 31 From the record, it appeared possible that counsel was attempting to
create a test case on the Equal Protection Issue for the benefit of the employer, disregarding the best interests of the defendants in having their sentences reduced. 3 2 The possible conflict of interest was apparent enough in
the record to impose a duty to inquire upon the trial court. 33 Because the
Court was not briefed on the issue, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the possible conflict of interest actually existed and the Court
remanded the case for a "hearing to determine whether the conflict of interest that this record strongly suggests actually existed ....
Wood addressed a slightly different situation than that in Sullivan.
35
No formal objection to the representation was made at trial in either case.
128.
Id.
129. Id. at 262-63.
130.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 266-67.
131.
132.
Id. at 266-68. Defense counsel did not protest the amount of the fines even though
there was evidence that the defendants could not afford to pay such large fines from their
salaries. Id. at 267-68. Counsel did not move to have the fines reduced until the last day
before the defendants' probations were to be revoked. Id. at 268. In addition, the employer
was willing to post bond for all three defendants as well as pay for their attorney, but failed to
pay their fines as promised, indicating possible ulterior motives. Id. at 266-67.
133.
Id. at 272. The Court never specifically states what a trial court would have to do to
fulfill the duty to inquire. See id. However, the Court in Sullivan found that multiple representation alone is not enough to trigger a duty to inquire. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,
346 (1980). The concurring Justices disagreed, stating that in every situation of joint representation the trial court should have a duty to inquire. See id. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring), 354 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, referred to the duty
to inquire as "the duty of the trial court ... to ensure that the defendants have not unwittingly
given up their constitutional right to effective counsel." Id. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall described the inquiry this way: "[W]henever two or more defendants are
represented by the same attorney the trial judge must make a preliminary determination that
the joint representation is the product of the defendants' informed choice." Id. at 354 (Marshall, J., concurring). Thus, it appears that the duty to inquire involves informing the defendant of the possible conflict of interest and obtaining consent before allowing the representation. See id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
134.
Wood, 450 U.S. at 262-63, 272-73. Following the Wood decision, the Georgia Court
of Appeals vacated its previous judgment and remanded the case to the trial court "for further
proceedings consistent with [the United States Supreme Court] opinion." Wood v. Georgia,
280 S.E.2d 439 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981). No further decision was reported on remand.
135.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347; see also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1980).
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However, in Sullivan, no other "special circumstances" would have brought
a potential conflict of interest home to the trial judge; therefore, there was no
duty to inquire.136 In Wood, on the other hand, Justice Powell wrote that the
possible conflict of interest was apparent enough that the trial court had a
duty to inquire. 37 Justice Powell commented, "Moreover, Sullivan mandates a reversal when the trial court has failed to make an inquiry even
though it 'knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict ex13
ists.

''

8

The Court remanded the case "to determine whether the conflict of
interest that this record strongly suggests actually existed . . " and if an
actual conflict of interest was found, a new revocation hearing was to be
held "untainted by a legal representative serving conflicting interests."' 39
The Court chose not to grant an outright reversal because the issues had not
been briefed. 40 Thus, in a case in which the trial court knew or should have
known of a potential conflict of interest and failed to inquire, the appropriate
remedy is reversal and a grant of new proceedings "untainted by ...conflicting interests" if the Court can find from the record and the briefs that the
actual conflict of interest existed at the time of trial.' 4'
Wyoming Law
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Wyoming chose to provide greater
protection than that afforded by the federal system in conflict of interest
cases involving multiple representation.' 42 In Shongutsie v. State, the issue
was whether a husband and wife represented by the same attorney had been
deprived of their constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.'43
The husband and wife in this case had both participated in a street brawl in
Riverton, Wyoming, which left one man dead and several others injured.'"
Mr. Shongutsie was accused of first-degree murder and Mrs. Shongutsie was
accused of aggravated assault. 45 The Constitution of the State of Wyoming
states, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to de-

136. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347-48.
137.
Wood, 450 U.S. at 272.
138.
Id. at 273 n. 18 (citing Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347).
139.
Id. at 273-74.
140.
Id. Justice Powell comments that if the appropriate motion is made on remand, the
trial court has the discretion to reverse the convictions. Id. at 274 n.21. "There also is the
possibility that this relief may be available in habeas corpus proceedings, if petitioners can
show an actual conflict of interest during the trials or at the time of sentencing." Id.
141.
See id. at 273-74.
142.
Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361 (Wyo. 1992).
143.
Id. at 362.
144.
Id. at 363.
145.
Id.
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fend in person and by counsel ....

The court examined the federal cases

defining the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and rejected the holding in Sullivan requiring a defendant to show both an actual
conflict of interest and an adverse effect when the trial court had no reason
to know of the conflict of interest.'47 Instead, the court chose to "more
firmly protect the defendant's right to representation by an attorney who is
free from any conflict of interest."' 48 The Wyoming rule on conflict of interest in cases of multiple representation became: "[P]rejudice will be presumed in all instances of multiple representation of criminal defendants and,
waiver, multiple representation will constiin the absence of an appropriate
' 49
tute reversible error."'
The Supreme Court of Wyoming reaffirmed its position in
Shongutsie later that year in Kenney v. State. 50 The situation in Kenney was
different from Shongutsie in that the same counsel represented Kenney and
her boyfriend, but they had separate trials.' "In either case, the trial judge
has a duty to apprise the defendant of conflict problems that may develop
during any dual representation of interested parties."'52 The court found that
this interpretation was consistent with Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure
44(c), which states: "Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no
conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall order separate representation."' 53 The court noted that the comparable Federal Rule of Criminal ProWYO.CONST. art. I, § 10. Compare with the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of
146.
counsel which reads, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall.., have the assistance of
counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
147.
Shongutsie, 827 P.2d at 366-67. The court observed that "protection of constitutional
rights of an accused is not the peculiar province of the federal courts." Id. at 367 (quoting
Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483,491 (Wyo. 1975)).
Id.
148.
Id. at 367. The court reasoned that the possibility of a conflict of interest is so great
149.
in cases of multiple representation that "any case-by-case inquiry is ill-advised and unwise."
Id. The court also proclaimed that it was "disinterested in establishing a rule... which would
not emphasize the importance of different counsel where any conflict in representation could
be envisioned." Id. (quoting Reynoldson v. State, 737 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Wyo. 1987)). The
court also found that the automatic reversal rule would further three policy goals. Id at 36768. First, the rule would "discourage attorneys from accepting the role of a dual advocate in
criminal cases and thereby potentially compromising their most fundamental duty - loyalty to
the individual client." Id. at 367 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
Second, the rule "promotes the effective administration of justice" by defining the trial court's
role when a case involves multiple representation. Id. at 368. Finally, "and perhaps most
important, the rule better ensures that all defendants will be fully apprised of their constitutional right to be represented by an attorney free of any conflict of interest." Id. The court
observed that other jurisdictions have also adopted a similar rule despite contrary federal case
law. Id. at 367 (citing Harvey v. State, 619 P.2d 1214 (Nev. 1980); Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d
275 (Alaska 1978); Commonwealth v. Davis, 384 N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1978); State v. Olsen,
258 N.W.2d 898 (Minn. 1977)).
150.
837 P.2d 664 (Wyo. 1992).
Id. at 673.
151.
Id.
152.
153.
Id. (citing Wyo.R.CRIM.P. 44(c)).
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cedure is not as strict because it does not order separate representation, but
only requires the court to take "appropriate measures."' 54 The purpose of
Wyoming's stricter rule, the court added, is "[i]n part, . . . to protect the defendant; [and] in reality, it protects the prosecutor from a subsequent claim
of an invalid guilty verdict.""'
The next year the Supreme Court of Wyoming decided Saldana v.
State."6 The court in Saldana was faced with an analysis of the reasonableness of a search and seizure under the Wyoming Constitution.'57 The majority, using federal law almost exclusively, found that the Wyoming Constitution did not provide more protection against search and seizure than the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution."1 In his concurrence,
Justice Golden laid out six criteria to be considered when deciding if the
state constitution should be interpreted differently than the federal Constitution. 9 The criteria are: (1) the textual language; (2) the differences in the
texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) pre-existing state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local concern."'° These crite6
ria are now collectively referred to as the Saldana test.' '
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Mickens v. Taylor, decided on March 27, 2002, the United
States Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide a case similar to Wood
v. Georgia,in that the trial court knew of the potential conflict of interest but
failed to inquire. 62 In Mickens, the Court assumed in its statement of the
issue that Judge Foster knew or should have known of a potential conflict of
interest and failed to inquire. 63 The only question for the Court was what
the defendant had to prove to show a violation of the Sixth Amendment right
to the assistance of counsel in that situation."6 Justice Scalia, writing for the
154. Kenney, 837 P.2d at 673. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) states: "Unless it
appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court
shall take such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's right to counsel."
FED.R.CRIM.P. 44(c).
155.
Kenney, 837 P.2d at 673.
156.
846 P.2d 604 (Wyo. 1993).
157. Id. at 606.
158. Id. at 610-12.
159. Id. at 622 (Golden, J., concurring). This approach was later adopted by the majority
in Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1999).
160. Saldana, 846 P.2d at 622 (Golden, J., concurring).
161.
Mogard v. City of Laramie, 32 P.3d 313, 315 (Wyo. 2001). The Saldana test was
recently employed by the court in Mogard v. City of Laramie where the court found that a
separate analysis under the Wyoming Constitution was warranted after examining the six
criteria. Id. at 315-23. However, the court ultimately concluded that the Wyoming Constitution should be interpreted in the same manner as the Constitution of the United States. Id. at
321.
162. Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002).
163.
Id. at 1239.
164. Id.
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65
majority, closely examined the holdings of Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood.'
In Holloway, the Court established that reversal would be automatic if counsel objected to the representation, but was nevertheless forced to represent
the defendants without a determination of whether a conflict of interest exIn Sullivan, the Court held that absent special circumstances, such
isted.'
as an objection, that would impose a duty on the trial court to inquire, the
defendant must show that an actual conflict adversely affected defense counsel's performance.' 67 Justice Scalia went on to interpret what, if any, effect
68
the Wood opinion had on the precedent set forth in Holloway and Sullivan.'

The Court first examined the meaning of the language of Justice
Powell's remand instruction in Wood, directing the lower court to determine
whether an "actual conflict" existed.'69 Counsel for Mickens argued that the
remand instruction established an "unambiguous rule" that a conviction must
be reversed where the trial court failed to inquire into a conflict of interest of
which it knew or should have known and the actual conflict of interest can
be shown. 7 ° Counsel for Mickens also argued that the Wood Court's silence
as to whether an adverse effect was also required to be shown on remand
proved that the defendant must only show an actual conflict of interest and
72
not an adverse effect. 7' The majority disagreed.' "As used in the remand
instruction, . . . we think 'an actual conflict of interest' meant precisely a
conflict that affected counsel's performance - as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties."'7 The Court decided that Justice Powell's use of
the words "actual conflict of interest" in Wood was shorthand for an actual
74
conflict of interest adversely affecting counsel's performance.' Thus, even
in a situation where the trial court knew of a potential conflict of interest and
failed to inquire, the defendant must prove both that an actual conflict ex75 Accordingly,
isted and that it adversely affected counsel's performance.'
Id. at 1241-45.
165.
Id. at 1241-42 (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 498 (1978)).
166.
Id. at 1242 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-49 (1980)).
167.
Id. at 1242-45.
168.
Id. at 1243-44.
169.
Id. at 1243.
170.
Id.
171.
Id. at 1243-44.
172.
Id. at 1243.
173.
174. Id. The Court reasoned that this interpretation was the only one consistent with Justice Powell's statement regarding why the Wood Court had to remand the case: "On the record before us, we cannot be sure whether counsel was influenced in his basic strategicdecisions by the interest of the employer who hired him." Id. at 1243-44 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272 (1981)). In addition, "The notion that Wood created a new rule sub
silentio - and in a case where certiorari had been granted on an entirely different question,
and the parties had neither briefed nor argued the conflict-of-interest issue - is implausible."
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1245. The Court dismissed the language from footnote 18 in Wood that said
175.
"Sullivan mandates" a reversal when the trial court fails to inquire into a potential conflict of
interest of which it knew or should have known, saying that it was inconsistent with the holding in Wood, which remanded the case instead of reversing it. Id. at 1243 n.3. The Court
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because no such effect was found by the Court of Appeals, Mickens' conviction and death sentence were affirmed.'76
As a policy matter, the Mickens Court reasoned that its decision
would not decrease the incentive for trial judges to be attentive and inquire
into potential conflicts of interest.'77 Even though the danger of automatic
reversal is removed as a disincentive, a conflict of interest still decreases the
burden on the defendant in obtaining a new trial. 7 When the defendant can
demonstrate a conflict of interest, the defendant does not have to show that
the defense was prejudiced, only that counsel's performance was adversely
affected.' 79 According to the majority, this is ample incentive for the trial
court to promptly address conflicts of interest.180 In addition, the Court reasoned that it "makes little policy sense" to distinguish between cases in
which the trial court knew of the conflict of interest and those in which it did
not because the "trial court's awareness of a potential conflict neither renders it more likely that counsel's performance was significantly affected nor
in any other way renders the verdict unreliable."''
Finally, the Court limited the scope of its decision in Mickens.' s2
The Court was explicit that its decision did not endorse the use of the Sullivan test in all cases of successive representation. 3 The Court indicated that
the Sullivan test has been employed too widely in conflict of interest
cases. 4 The more appropriate test in cases involving conflicts of interest,
but not in the context of multiple representation, may be Strickland."5
ConcurringOpinion
In his concurring opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice
Kennedy wrote that although Saunders acted unethically when he did not
inform Mickens or the trial court of the potential conflict of interest, his representation was not necessarily affected.'
In fact, Saunders' "mistaken
belief' that he "had no continuing duty at all to his deceased client," proved
that he was not influenced in his representation of Mickens by any interest
found that "[t]o the extent the "mandates a reversal" statement goes beyond the assertion of
mere jurisdiction to reverse, it is dictum - and dictum inconsistent with the disposition in
Wood, which was not to reverse but to vacate and remand for the trial court to conduct the
inquiry it had omitted." Id.
176. Id. at 1245.
177. Id. at 1244-45.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1244.
180. Id. at 1244-45.
181.
Id. at 1244.
182.
Id. at 1245-46.
183.
Id.
184. Id. at 1245.
185.
Id. at 1246.
186.
Id. at 1247 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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he had for Hall.' 87 Justice Kennedy advocated a case-by-case analysis to
determine if trial counsel's performance was adversely affected rather than
8 Justice
outright reversal of the conviction due to a conflict of interest.

Kennedy also pointed out that "the infringement of that right [to assistance
of counsel] must depend on a deficiency of the lawyer, not of the trial
judge."' 189
DissentingOpinions
Justice Stevens' dissent focused on the relationship between lawyer and client in a capital murder case.' 90 Trust, he argued, is absolutely
essential to elicit the kind of cooperation necessary to develop the best defense strategy possible.'9 ' In this case, Saunders' deception was detrimental
to developing that trust and choosing a strategy by which Mickens could
have avoided the death penalty. 92 Justice Stevens also discussed the heightened responsibility of the trial judge to protect the constitutional rights of an
indigent defendant.' 93 He argued that when a defendant cannot afford an
attorney to represent him in his defense, and the court must appoint one for
that purpose, the court must be even more diligent in protecting the right of
to assistance of counsel than when the defendant retains his
the defendant 94
own attorney.
Justice Stevens also explained why the precedent established in
195
Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood supported reversal of Mickens' conviction.
If Saunders had objected at trial, he reasoned, there would be no question
that the conviction would be reversed.' 96 In this case, the defendant who
187.

Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). At a district court evidentiary hearing to determine

whether Saunders was operating under a conflict of interest, it was shown that "as far as
Saunders was concerned, his allegiance to Hall, '[e]nded when I walked into the courtroom
and they told me he was dead and the case was gone."' Id. (quoting Hearing Tr. 156-57, 218
(Jan. 13, 1999)).

188.

Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). According to Justice Kennedy, the fact that in Mickens

the conflict of interest had no effect on Saunders' performance demonstrated the necessity of
a case-by-case approach. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). An undesirable automatic reversal

rule would overturn convictions like Mickens' even when the conflict of interest did not affect counsel's performance. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
189.
Id. at 1248-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190.
Id. at 1248 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Mickens maintained he was innocent throughout the trial
192.
and sentencing. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). If Saunders could have persuaded Mickens to

admit that he stabbed Hall, but testify that the sodomy was consensual and not forcible, the
death penalty would have been removed from the table. Id. at 1248-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The fact that the sodomy was forced was the only fact that put Mickens at risk of the
death penalty. Id. at 1249 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 1250-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194.
Id. at 1251-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195.
Id. at 1252 n.l 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196.
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needed the most protection, the one whose counsel did not have the ethical
awareness to object to the defense of his own client's murderer, was afforded the least protection.197
Justice Souter's dissent primarily disputed the Court's interpretation of the decision in Wood. 9 ' Justice Souter saw no conflict between the
opinions in Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood; rather, he saw a coherent scheme
formed by the three opinions.'99 Justice Souter saw Holloway and Sullivan

as establishing two separate and distinct rules. 00 First, if a potential conflict

of interest is recognized before trial and the judge fails to inquire, reversal is
appropriate, as in Holloway."' Second, if the potential conflict comes to the
attention of the trial court after the trial, as in Sullivan, the defendant must
show that an actual conflict adversely affected counsel.0 2 Wood, he argued,
followed this scheme because the trial court was not on notice of a potential
conflict until the end of the revocation hearing, and thus the defendant was
required to show an actual conflict.0 3 Applying the so called "prospective
notice rule" to Mickens, Souter found that because the trial court knew or
should have known of the conflict of interest before the trial, reversal was
appropriate. 2"
The final holding in Mickens v. Taylor was that to demonstrate a
violation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel, the
defendant must show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected
counsel's performance, even when the trial court knew of the potential con-

197.
Id. at 1252 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198.
Id. at 1253-63 (Souter, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1256 (Souter, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
201.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
203.
Id. at 1257-60 (Souter, J., dissenting).
204. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). The final dissent, written by Justice Breyer and joined
by Justice Ginsburg, took a categorical approach. Id. at 1264 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice
Breyer argued that Saunders' representation of Mickens "created a 'structural defect affecting
the framework within which the trial [and sentencing] proceeds, rather than simply an error in
the trial process itself."' Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 310 (1991)). Justice Breyer chose this approach for three reasons. Id. at 1264-65
(Breyer, J., dissenting). First, he found that the representation was "egregious on its face."
Id. at 1264 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Second, he reasoned that in a capital murder case, the
balance between life and death is slight. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). The conflict of interest
could easily have tipped that balance. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Finally, the state "itself
created the conflict in the first place." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer found that
this situation "at a minimum, [creates] the appearance that the proceeding will not reliably
serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence .... " Id. at 1265
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations and quotations omitted). "This appearance, together with
the likelihood of prejudice in the typical case, are [sic] serious enough to warrant a categorical
rule - a rule that does not require proof of prejudice in the individual case." Id. at 1265
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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flict of interest and failed to inquire." 5 According to the Supreme Court, the
fact that the trial judge knew of the potential conflict of interest and failed to
take any affirmative action did not change the analysis.20 6 The defendant
had to make a showing of both an actual conflict and an adverse effect.2" 7
ANALYSIS

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Mickens v.
the previous case law regarding conflicts of interest
misinterpreted
Taylor
and effective assistance of counsel. It effectively established two separate
rules. First, a trial court has a duty to inquire into a conflict of interest when
it knows or should know of the conflict. Second, a defendant must show
both an actual conflict and an adverse effect on counsel's performance to
prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, regardless of
whether the trial court knew or should have known of the conflict of interest.
Additionally, the Court did not address the policy and ethical implications
involved as a result of the decision. Finally, Mickens affects not only the
conflict of interest law in Wyoming, but in the United States as well.
The New Rule Created by Mickens
1. The Sixth Amendment Right to Assistance of Counsel
The defendant, when claiming a violation of the Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel, has the burden of showing the violation.2 '
Depending on the situation, three different burdens of proof are applied
when a defendant claims ineffective assistance.20 9 Each burden becomes
easier to meet as the circumstances surrounding the ineffective assistance
become more egregious." First, if the defendant is attempting to prove ineffective assistance without any special circumstances, the defendant must
meet the highest burden of showing a prejudicial effect, or that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different."2 1' In cases in which a conflict
of interest existed and the trial court had no reason to know of the conflict,
the defendant has an intermediate burden."' The defendant does not have to
show prejudice or an effect on the outcome of the case, but must show that
the actual conflict of interest existed and that it adversely affected counsel's

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 1245.
Id.
Id.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
See id. at 691-92.
See id.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 692.
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performance. 13 Finally, in cases in which prejudice will be presumed, the
burden on the defendant is least and automatic reversal is appropriate.2 t4
Situations in which prejudice will be presumed are cases in which assistance
of counsel was denied altogether or when the state interfered with assistance
of counsel.2t 5 In addition, a presumption of prejudice attaches in a conflict
of interest case when counsel actively represented conflicting interests, and
the conflict of interest was "brought home" to the trial court through an objection or otherwise. 1 6
None of the conflict of interest cases prior to Mickens required the
Strickland showing of prejudice - a reasonable probability that but for
counsel's mistakes, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.217 In Holloway, prejudice was presumed because the defense counsel
recognized an actual conflict of interest and brought it to the trial court's
attention with several objections, none of which was seriously considered.2"'
In Sullivan, the defendant had the intermediate burden of showing an actual
conflict of interest and an adverse effect on counsel's performance because
the trial court had no reason to know of the conflict of interest before trial. 219
Finally, the Court in Wood remanded the case for a determination of whether
there was an actual conflict, but not an adverse effect. 22 This indicates that
213. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S 335, 348 (1980). The difficulty of proving that a conflict
of interest adversely affected counsel's performance was recognized by Justice Marshall in
Sullivan. Id. at 355 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall found, "Such a test is not
only unduly harsh, but incurable speculative as well." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring). "Moreover, a showing that an actual conflict adversely affected counsel's performance is not only
unnecessary, it is often an impossible task." Id. at 356-57 (Marshall, J., concurring). The
Holloway Court commented:
It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice
resulting from an attorney's failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but
even with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests
[sic] on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations
would be virtually impossible.
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978).
214.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.

215.

Id.

216.
See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71, 75-76 (1942); see also Holloway, 435
U.S. at 488 (applying the Glasser Court's reasoning in finding that when an objection is the
means by which the conflict is "brought home" to the trial court, reversal is warranted); Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346-47 (holding that the trial court has no duty to inquire absent "special
circumstances" indicating a conflict of interest).
217.
See Glasser v. State, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978);
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1971).
218.
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 477-80, 491.
219.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348.
220.
Wood, 450 U.S. at 273-74. The Wood Court found that the conflict of interest was
apparent enough at the probation revocation hearing that the trial court should have known of
the possible conflict and should have inquired. Id. at 272. It is important to note that the
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when the trial court at the probation revocation hearing knew or reasonably
should have known of the conflict, but failed to inquire, the defendant had
the lowest burden (as in Holloway), and prejudice would be presumed without a finding of adverse effect.22'
From the holdings in Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood, it appeared that
in conflict of interest cases, the defendant would have to meet one of two
burdens: Either prove that an actual conflict adversely affected counsel's
performance or that the actual conflict existed and the trial court failed to
inquire so that prejudice should be presumed. The burden the defendant had
to meet was determined by whether the trial court knew or should have
known of the conflict of interest and failed to inquire. If the trial court did
not know of the conflict of interest, the defendant had to prove that the conflict existed and that it adversely affected counsel's performance."' If the
court knew of the conflict of interest and failed to inquire, prejudice would
be presumed and reversal would be appropriate when the conflict of interest
actually existed.223 Although this is a logical conclusion, it is not how the
Court decided Mickens v. Taylor.224
2. The Sixth Amendment Right to Assistance of Counsel After
Mickens
The United States Supreme Court in Mickens held that even in a
situation where the trial court knew or should have known of a potential
conflict of interest and failed to inquire, the defendant must meet the Sullivan test by showing both that an actual conflict existed and that such conflict
holding in Wood does not explicitly state that a finding of an adverse effect on counsel's
performance is unnecessary to obtain a reversal. See id. at 273-74. The Court is silent on
whether an adverse effect is required. Id. That silence can be interpreted in one of two ways.
First, it could be said that the Wood Court meant to imply that an adverse effect is also necessary and neglected to say so, as the Mickens Court concluded. See Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S.
Ct. 1237, 1243 (2002). The second interpretation is that the Wood Court's remand requires a
showing of exactly what it says it requires - an actual conflict and nothing more. This interpretation is more plausible. It is consistent with other statements in Wood, such as "Sullivan
mandates a reversal when the trial court has failed to make an inquiry even though it knows
or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists." Wood, 450 U.S. at 272 n.18
(quotations and citations omitted) (second emphasis added). The Wood Court also stated,
"There also is the possibility that [vacating petitioners' sentences or reversing their convictions] may be available in habeas corpus proceedings, if petitioners can show an actual conflict of interest during the trials or at the time of sentencing." /d. at 274 n.21 (emphasis
added). Note that neither of these comments made by the Wood Court includes any language
about an adverse effect.
Wood, 450 U.S. at 273-74.
221.
222. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348.
Wood, 450 U.S. at 473-74. For a discussion of the ambiguity of the holding in Wood
223.
v. Georgia,see supra note 220.
224. Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1245 (holding that even in a situation where the trial court
knew of a potential conflict of interest and failed to inquire, the defendant must prove both
that an actual conflict existed and that it adversely affected counsel's performance).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2003

57

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 3 [2003], No. 1, Art. 8
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 3

had an adverse effect on counsel's performance.225 The Court misinterpreted
Wood, finding that the Wood Court required a showing of actual conflict and
an adverse effect even when the trial court knew of the conflict of interest.226
Thus, with Wood controlling, Mickens was also required to show both an
actual conflict and an adverse effect.
Putting aside the Court's interpretation of Wood, the result in Mickens is inconsistent with the holdings in Holloway and Sullivan that clearly
demonstrate that different standards should be applied depending on whether
the trial court knew or should have known of the conflict of interest. 2 7 The
most meaningful distinction between Holloway and Sullivan is that in Holloway the conflict of interest was "brought home" to the trial court, whereas
in Sullivan it was not.228 According to this logic, Mickens is more analogous
to Holloway than Sullivan because in both Mickens and Holloway the trial
court knew or should have known of the conflict of interest. If Mickens had
been evaluated under the Holloway standard, automatic reversal would have
been appropriate if the conflict of interest actually existed.229 However, the
Mickens Court found that even when the trial court knew or should have
known of the conflict of interest (as in Holloway), the applicable test was
Sullivan.23 The question then becomes: How did the Court distinguish Holloway and Mickens to find that the situation in Mickens was more similar to
Sullivan than Holloway?
The most reasonable distinction that can be made between Mickens
and Holloway, if not whether the conflict of interest was "brought home" to
the trial court, is how the conflict of interest was "brought home" to the trial
court. In Holloway, the trial judge learned of the conflict of interest from
" ' In
counsel's objections.23
Mickens, the trial judge knew or should have
known of the conflict of interest because she appointed Saunders to defend
Mickens knowing that Saunders had three days before represented the victim. 232 Thus, according to the Mickens Court, a presumption of prejudice no
225. Id. at 1245. The Court assumed in its statement of the issue that the trial judge knew
or should have known of the conflict of interest but failed to inquire. Id. at 1239. The United
State Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated, "We accept for purposes of discussion,
without deciding the issue, that Judge Foster, who appointed Saunders to represent Mickens,
reasonably should have known that Saunders labored under a potential conflict of interest
arising from his previous representation of Hall." Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 357 (4th
Cir. 2001) (en banc). The District Court concluded in its opinion that Judge Foster knew or
should have known of the potential conflict of interest when she appointed Saunders to defend Mickens. Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586, 614 (E.D. Va. 1999).
226. Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1243-45. For a discussion of the holding in Wood, see supra
notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
229. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978).
230. Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1243-45.
231.
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 477-80.
232.
Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol3/iss1/8

58

Crago: Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure - Consensual Encounter or Coe
CASE NOTE

2003

longer turns on whether the conflict was "brought home" to the trial court,
but rather on whether the conflict was "brought home" to the trial court
through counsel's objection to the representation.
The new rule promulgated by Mickens is that absent an objection
by defense counsel, the trial court's failure to inquire into a potential conflict
of interest about which it knew or should have known does not merit reversal unless the defendant can independently demonstrate that an actual conflict adversely affected counsel's performance.2 33 Nothing in Holloway,
233. Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1243-45. The Court did not take the opportunity to clarify the
definition of either "actual conflict of interest" or "adverse effect on counsel's performance"
in its decision. Authorities differ as to the definitions of both terms. "Conflict of interest" is
defined in a variety of ways. Black's Law Dictionary defines conflict of interest as, "A real
or seemingly incompatibility between the interests of two of a lawyer's clients, such that the
lawyer is disqualified from representing both clients if the dual representation adversely af-

fects either client or if the clients do not consent."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

295 (7th ed.

1999). The Glasser Court referred to a conflict of interest as a "struggle to serve two masters." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942). The Court in Sullivan distinguished
between an "actual conflict," which would give rise to the duty to inquire, and a "possible
conflict," which does not merit an inquiry by the trial court. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,
348-50 (1980). Neither term was sufficiently defined. Justice Marshall's dissent in Sullivan,
however, adopted the definition set out by the American Bar Association that "a lawyer
should not undertake multiple representation 'if the duty to one of the defendants may conflict
with the duty to another."' Id. at 356 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting ABA Project on
Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function, Standard 4-3.5(b) (App. Draft, 2d ed.
1979)). Justice Marshall went on to quote the Canons of Professional Ethics, which state that
"a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose." Id. (Marshall, J., concur-

ring) (quoting

CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

Canon 6 (1937)). Justice Marshall finally

concluded:
There is a possibility of conflict, then, if the interests of the defendants
may diverge at some point so as to place the attorney under inconsistent
duties. There is an actual, relevant conflict of interest if, during the
course of the representation, the defendants' interests do diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action.
Id. Today the ABA states that "a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
The Mickens Court gave cryptic guidance as to the meaning of conflict of interest. Mickens,
122 S.Ct. at 1243. While interpreting the meaning of the remand instruction in Wood that
required a determination of whether an actual conflict existed, the Court stated, "As used in
the remand instruction ... we think 'an actual conflict of interest' meant precisely a conflict
that affected counsel's performance - as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties."
Id. Thus, after Mickens, the definition of "actual conflict of interest" includes an adverse
effect. This is a new definition of conflict of interest, as none of the definitions discussed
above indicates adverse effect is necessarily part of a conflict of interest.
The Court was no more clear on the definition or test for adverse effect. It was clear,
however, that the facts presented in Mickens do not constitute an adverse effect or the conviction would have been overturned.. The District Court in Mickens used a three-part test for
adverse effect drawn from Freund v. Butterworth. Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586,
602-04 (E.D. Va. 1999) (citing Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839, 860 (1 1th Cir. 1999)).
The first element is that the defendant, "must point to some plausible alternative defense
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however, indicates that the only way in which the trial court can learn of a
conflict of interest is through an objection.234 In fact, the Holloway Court
adopted the language of Glasserthat reversal is required when the "possibility of ... inconsistent interests" is "brought home" to the trial court. 3' In
Sullivan, the Court made reference to "special circumstances," finding that if
"special circumstances" indicate a conflict of interest in cases of multiple
representation, the trial court will be required to inquire into the conflict of
interest. 23' Thus, neither Holloway nor Sullivan envisioned an objection as
the only circumstance that could trigger the duty to inquire, and an automatic
reversal for failure to inquire. The Mickens Court, however, disregarded the
general language of "brought home" and "special circumstances" in Holloway and Sullivan respectively in favor of the more narrow term "objection." '37

strategy or tactic [that] might have been pursued." Id. Second, the defendant "must demonstrate that the alternative strategy or tactic was reasonable under the facts." Id. Finally, the
defendant "must show some link between the actual conflict and the decision to forgo the
alternative strategy of defense." Id. Although adverse effect does not require the defendant
to show prejudice, "he must show that the conflict was deleterious or harm[ful] to counsel's
advocacy." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The court then held that "even if it
is assumed that there was a plausible, viable alternate strategy that Saunders failed to pursue,
the record shows no link between the failure to pursue it and the asserted conflict." 1d. at 610.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mickens stated, "A defendant has established an adverse effect if he proves that his attorney took action on behalf of one client that was necessarily adverse to the defense of another ....
Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 360 (4th Cir.
2001) (en banc). The court went on to endorse the same three-part test adopted by the lower
court and deferred to the lower court's determination that an adverse effect was not shown in
this case. Id. at 362. The Mickens Court never explicitly adopted the Freundthree-part test,
but did so by implication when it deferred to the lower court's finding of no adverse effect.
See Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1245.
234. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
235. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485.
236. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346-47. The Court stated that "[a]bsent special circumstances..
. trial courts may assume either that multiple representation entails no conflict or that the
lawyer and his clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist." Id. Sullivan
refers to cases of multiple representation, holding that a conflict of interest leading to ineffective assistance of counsel will not be presumed in all such cases. 1d. at 348-49. Thus, unless
special circumstances indicate the contrary, the trial court can assume that a situation in which
multiple defendants are represented by the same counsel does not present a conflict of interest
or that the defendants have consented to the representation knowing the inherent risk of a
conflict of interest. Id at 346-47. Mickens is distinguished from this scenario in two ways.
First, Mickens is a case of successive representation as opposed to multiple representation.
Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1245-46. Second, whereas in Sullivan no "special circumstances" were
present to trigger the trial court's duty to inquire, in Mickens "special circumstances" should
have given rise to an inquiry by the trial court. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347; see supra note 225.
237. See Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1244-45. The "special circumstance" that should have
"brought home" the potential conflict of interest to the trial court in Mickens was the fact that
the judge who appointed Saunders to be Mickens' defense counsel had three days previously
dismissed the charges against the victim using a form on a single sheet of paper that clearly
named Saunders as defense counsel for the victim. Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 354 (4th
Cir. 2001) (en banc). The Court held that these circumstances were enough to mandate a
Sullivan inquiry, but were insufficient to require a reversal, as in Holloway where the poten-
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In effect, the Court held that the trial court has no obligation to inquire unless prompted to do so by defense counsel's objection. The responsibility of ensuring conflict-free counsel is then left in the hands of the very
counsel who has the conflict. Holloway opined that an "attorney... is in the
best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of
interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial."238 The Court
then stated that "defense attorneys have the obligation, upon discovering a
'
The obliconflict of interest, to advise the court at once of the problem."239
to
Mickens,
comfort
is
of
small
however,
gation imposed by Holloway,
whose own counsel saw no conflict of interest where Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States recognized one. 2" Thus, those defendants who
need the protection the most are denied it.24'
Policy Considerations
1. DecreasedIncentives for Trial Judges to Protect the Right to Conflict-Free Counsel
One unsavory effect of Mickens is that the incentive for trial judges
to be vigilant about potential conflicts of interest is decreased. The Mickens
decision has left us with two rules. The first is the Sullivan-mandated inquiry rule.242 The second is that when the trial court fails to inquire about a
conflict of interest about which it should have known, the defendant must
show both an actual conflict and an adverse effect on counsel's performance
to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel.243
This is the same burden required when the trial court has no reason to know
of the conflict of interest. 2" Thus, although the trial court has a duty to inquire, the burden of proof for the defendant remains constant whether the
trial court inquires or not.245

tial conflict of interest was "brought home" to the trial court through an objection by defense
counsel. See Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1244-45. Thus, the Court held that the only real "special
circumstance" that will mandate reversal is an objection by defense counsel. See supra notes
225-33 and accompanying text.
238.
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485 (quotations and citations omitted).
239.
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485-86 (citation omitted).
240.
Justice Stevens found that "Saunders necessarily labored under conflicting obligations
that were irreconcilable." Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1249 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy, concurring with the Mickens majority, commented that Saunder's belief that "his allegiance to Hall, '[e]nded when I walked into the courtroom and they told me he was dead and
the case was gone' may have been mistaken. Id. at 1247 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting
Hearing Tr. 156-57, 218 (Jan. 13, 1999)).
241.
Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1262 (Souter, J., dissenting).
242. Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1244 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-49 (1980)).
243.
Id. at 1245.
244. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348.
245. Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1244-45. Justice Souter makes this exact argument in his dissent. Id. at 1260-61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The Court in Glasser emphasized the important role of the trial
judge in protecting the constitutional rights of the accused.246 "Upon the trial
judge rests the duty of seeing that the trial is conducted with solicitude for
'
the essential rights of the accused."247
The Court, quoting Patton v. United
States, stated that such a duty
is not to be discharged as a matter of rote, but with sound
and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or
undue departures from that mode of trial or from any of the
essential elements thereof, and with a caution increasing in
degree as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity.248
The Court found that "instead of jealously guarding Glasser's rights, the
court may fairly be said to be responsible for creating a situation which re'
sulted in the impairment of those rights."249
To hold that Glasser implicitly
agreed to the appointment of counsel would be to "condone a dangerous
laxity on the part of the trial court in the discharge of its duty to preserve the
fundamental rights of an accused."25
The majority argues that the Sullivan standard, "which requires
proof of effect upon representation but . . . presumes prejudice," provides
enough incentive for trial judges to jealously guard the right of the accused
to unconflicted counsel.2 5' This argument fails, however, because the defendant enjoys this decreased burden whether or not the trial judge inquires.
Thus, there is no real effect on the burden a defendant must show in demonstrating a violation of the right to counsel when the judge fails to inquire.252
The only real difference occurs when the trial court is made aware of the
potential conflict of interest through an objection. If the trial court then fails
to inquire, the penalty is an automatic reversal of the conviction.253
2. EthicalImplicationsfor Defense Counsel
Beyond the trial court, the Mickens decision has great implications
for practicing defense attorneys. The Court's opinion holds that Mickens'

246.

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942).

247. Id.
248. Id. (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312-13 (1930)).
249. Id. The trial court in Mickens may be said to have created the conflict of interest by
appointing defense counsel when she knew or should have known of the potential conflict of
interest. See supra note 225. Mickens and Glasser are similar because in both cases the trial
court created the conflict of interest.
250.
Glasser,315 U.S. at 72.
251.
Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1244.
252. See supra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
253.
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978); see also supra notes 225-41 and
accompanying text.
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defense did not violate the Constitution.254 However, Saunders' representation of Mickens was clearly in violation of the ethical standards recognized
by the American Bar Association and codified by every state bar in the nation that prohibits representation involving conflicts of interest.2" One of
the purposes behind these ethical rules is to recognize the importance of a
lawyer's loyalty to a client.256 The ABA Model Rules acknowledge that
"[loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's
254. Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1245. The Court held there was no Sixth Amendment violation
because the conflict of interest had no adverse effect on Saunder's performance. Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002); Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Ethi255.
cists at 4, Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (2002) (No. 00-9285). Rule 1.7 of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct states:
Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A
concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2)

the representation is not prohibited by law;

(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by
one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the
same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002). Rule 1.9 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct deals directly with conflicts between present and former clients.
Rule 1.9 Conflict of Interest: Former Client
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent,
confirmed in writing.
Interestingly, both Rules 1.7 and 1.9
assume that the client whose interest is adverse to the present client's is alive to consent to the
present representation.
256. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2002).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (2002).
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'
relationship to a client."257
"A breach of the duty of loyalty is worse than
other ethical breaches because it is a breach of the most fundamental duty
owed to a client."25 Even Justice Kennedy concurring in the Mickens decision recognized that Saunders' representation of Mickens was probably not
ethical.2 9 This leads to the ironic conclusion that what is constitutional may
not always be ethical, and the ethical standard may be higher than the constitutional one. 2"

For a defense attorney the double standard means that although an
attorney may provide constitutionally sufficient assistance of counsel, rules
of ethics may be violated. Attorneys have good incentive to follow the rules
of ethics in their jurisdictions, whether or not the United States Constitution
requires a lower standard of conduct. Violation of an ethical rule is professional misconduct and can lead to a formal grievance filed against the attorney and disciplinary action taken by the court.26 ' Depending on the seriousness of the violation, the attorney may be disbarred, suspended, reprimanded, admonished, put on probation, or required to pay restitution.262 In
Brian Saunders' case, his representation of Mickens violated the ethical rules
257.

Id.

258.

Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Ethicists at 5, Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002)

(No. 00-9285).

259. Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1247 (Kennedy, J., concurring). "As far as Saunders was concerned, his allegiance to Hall '[e]nded when I walked into the courtroom and they told me he
was dead and the case was gone."' Id. (citation omitted).
260. The Court has acknowledged that a violation of an ethical standard may not be a
violation of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157, 165 (1986). The Court found that "[u]nder the Strickland standard, breach of an
ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
assistance of counsel." Id.
261.
Rule 8.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct states:
Rule 8.4 Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty.
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice..
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2002). The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions provide guidelines as to what sanctions should be imposed for attorney misconduct.
Rule 4.3 discusses appropriate sanction for attorneys who fail to avoid conflicts of interest.
ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS R. 4.3 (2001). Sanctions available for
representing conflicting interests range from disbarment to admonition. Id.
262. ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS R. 2.2-2.8 (200 1).
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of Virginia.26 3 Thus, Saunders may have been sanctioned for his representation of Mickens regardless of whether the representation fulfilled Mickens'
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.2 " The lower constitutional standards imposed by the Court for the effective assistance of counsel
are not in step with the ethical guidelines promulgated by the states and the
American Bar Association. If attorneys must choose one guide or the other
to follow, the higher ethical standards most likely will be adhered to in an
effort to avoid sanctions.
The Effect of Mickens on Conflict of Interest Law
1. Wyoming
Since Shongutsie v. State, the Supreme Court of Wyoming has reto
extend
the right to counsel beyond the scope defined by the United
fused
States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Wyoming recently declined to
extend the right to counsel to arrestees when deciding whether to take the
chemical test administered for driving under the influence." 5 The court discussed several cases in which it declined to extend the constitutional rights
as interpreted by the federal courts.266 The court applied the Saldana test and
found that right to counsel under the Wyoming Constitution should be interpreted in the same way as the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of
the Constitution.26 7 In discussing Shongutsie, the Mogard court observed
263. Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Ethicists at 11, Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237
(2002) (No. 00-9285). Saunders' representation of Mickens violated three separate provisions
of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. Saunders neglected to inform the
trial court of the previous representation, failed to disclose the representation of Hall to his
new client, and he represented conflicting interests without proper disclosure. Id. (citing
VIRGINIA CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY

DR 7-102(A), DR 5-105(C), EC 7-8, EC 5-19

(Michie 1992)).
264. Saunders' violation best fits under Rule 4.32 of the ABA Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions. Rule 4.32 reads: "Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that
conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client." ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING
LAWYER SANCTIONS R. 4.32 (2001). Suspension is the "removal of a lawyer from the practice
of law for a specified minimum period of time." ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER
SANCTIONS R. 2.3 (2001). The minimum suspension is generally no less than six months. Id.
265. Mogard v. City of Laramie, 32 P.3d 313, 325 (Wyo. 2001).
266. Id. at 319-22 (citing Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299 (Wyo. 1999) (stating that Wyoming lacks the constitutional history and "long tradition of state constitutional analysis" to
depart from the federal procedure); State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118 (Wyo. 1993) (adopting the
federal statutory elements test for lesser included offenses); Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512,
523 (Wyo. 1989) (adopting the federal rule on the right to confront witnesses); Best v. State,
736 P.2d 739 (Wyo. 1987) (declining to extend the right to counsel before the start of adversarial proceedings); Charpentier v. State, 736 P.2d 724, 724 (Wyo. 1987) (declining to extend
the right to counsel to the preindictment lineup stage of criminal proceedings); State v.
Heiner, 683 P.2d 629, 637 (Wyo. 1984) (following the federal rule that evidence obtained
prior to filing a criminal complaint is not obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel)).
267. Mogard, 32 P.3d at 321.
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that the unusual result "was based not so much on any discernment that the
right to counsel is different in Wyoming as on the perception that the federal
rule was difficult to implement. We preferred the ease of application of a
'
presumptive rule, and the public policies it promoted."268
The Supreme Court of Wyoming may eventually be faced with a
case similar to Mickens in which a conflict of interest is present due to successive representation, rather than multiple representation as in Shongutsie.
Undoubtedly the Saldana test, which was proposed after the Shongutsie decision, will be used. Based on the Saldana test, it may be found (as it was in
Mogard) that the right to counsel should be interpreted the same way in
Wyoming as it is in the federal courts. However, the court in Mogard recognized that the Shongutsie situation was different due to the difficulty in
implementing the federal rule set forth in Sullivan, and due to public policy
consideration specific to conflict of interest cases.269 The court will be faced
with whether to extend the automatic reversal rule adopted in Shongutsie, or
whether to defer to the federal interpretation in Mickens, which requires a
Sullivan showing of adverse effect before reversal. The same policy goals
expressed in Shongutsie will be implicated in a case similar to Mickens.27 ° In
addition, the Sullivan test, rejected in Shongutsie as "difficult to implement,"
is the same test applied by the Court in Mickens. It is difficult to say
whether the Supreme Court of Wyoming will come down with Shongutsie,
or whether it will find that it is wiser to follow the federal standards as it
found in Mogard. The ten-year trend of following federal precedent, however, indicates the likelihood that the court will adopt the Mickens/Sullivan
test in cases of successive representation.
2. Foreshadowingthe End of the Sullivan Test in Cases Other than
Multiple Representation
It is clear that the Sullivan test is the correct standard to be applied
in all conflict of interest cases involving multiple representations. The final
section of the Mickens majority opinion foreshadows a tightening of the
right to unconflicted counsel in future cases involving successive representa" ' The majority was concerned that the Sullivan
tion.27
test has been applied
"unblinkingly" to all types of conflicts cases." "It must be said ... that the
language of Sullivan itself does not clearly establish, or indeed even support,
268. Id. at 323.
269. Id.
270. The policy goals of the court in Shongutsie were to discourage attorneys from accepting the role of a dual advocate in criminal cases, "promot[ing] the effective administration of
justice," and ensuring "that all defendants will be fully apprised of their constitutional right to
be represented by an attorney free of any conflict of interest." Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d
361, 367-68 (Wyo. 1992). See supra note 149.
271. Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1245-46 (2002).
272.

Id. at 1245.
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'
such expansive application."273
Instead, the Strickland test, which requires a
showing of prejudice, may be better applied. 274 The Court found that when
deciding Mickens, it was unnecessary to address whether the Sullivan test
applies to all cases of successive representation. 2" Thus, "Whether Sullivan
should be extended to such cases remains, as far as the jurisprudence of this
'
Court is concerned, an open question."276
Mickens implied that in future
conflict of interest cases not involving multiple representation, the widely
used Sullivan test may be forsaken in favor of the less defendant-friendly
277

Strickland test.

CONCLUSION

Mickens v. Taylor clearly resolves any ambiguity in the Wood
holding, disfavoring the Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel.
Mickens has made it more difficult for a defendant whose counsel was actually burdened by a conflict of interest to obtain a remedy. Even when the
trial court knows or should know of the conflict of interest, the defendant
must prove that the conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's performance. Not only is this burden difficult to meet, but also flies in the face of
the holdings in Holloway and Sullivan and of common ethical standards of
representation. It also destroys any incentive for the trial court to inquire
into a conflict of interest because the burden on the defendant remains constant whether an inquiry is made or not. The bottom line is that Bryan
Saunders should not have been representing Walter Mickens without Mickens' informed consent. Yet, the Supreme Court of the United States did not
find that this ethical violation warranted a reversal of Mickens' conviction.278
Walter Mickens paid a great price for Saunders' conflict even though he
neither created nor knowingly accepted Saunders' conflict. Rather than living out the rest of his life in prison, Walter Mickens will be put to death.
HADASSAH REIMER

273.
Id.
274. Id. at 1246.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 1246.
278. Although the United States Supreme Court recognized Bryan Saunders had a conflict
of interest and violated the canons of professional ethics, it appears that Saunders has not
been sanctioned for his actions. See http://www.vsb.org/attomey/attSearch.asp (last visited
December 27, 2002) (listing all disciplinary actions of Virginia attorneys since January of
1991).
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